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Process and Reconciliation: Integrating the Duty to Consult 
 with Environmental Assessment 
1. Introduction
As the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples becomes operationalized within 
the frameworks of government decision-making, the agencies responsible for 
these decisions are increasingly turning to environmental assessment (EA) 
processes as one of the principal vehicles for carrying out those consultations. 
There is a pragmatic attractiveness to using EA processes to implement the duty to 
consult where the activity in question is subject to EA, since much of the 
information and analysis of the environmental effects of a proposed activity will 
be required to assess the impacts of that same activity on Aboriginal rights and 
interests. Integrating these processes is efficient since it minimizes the need for 
multiple consultations. As well, since consultations in one sphere may impact the 
scope of the activity under consideration in the other sphere - for example, 
consultations within the EA may result in project modifications that would have 
implications for the duty to consult Aboriginal people - the processes of 
consultation under the duty to consult and in EA are to some degree inseparable.  
The inextricability of these obligations does not however mean that the duty 
to consult and EA fit together with ease or without important implications for one 
another. Integrating the duty to consult with environment assessment requires 
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careful consideration of the unique obligations owed to Aboriginal people and the 
constitutional nature of those obligations. This article explores the practical and 
theoretical dimensions of using EA processes to implement the duty to consult. 
On the practical side, while EA has been identified by governments as the 
preferred avenue by which the duty to consult ought to be implemented, there 
remain questions about the limits of EA to satisfy the duty to consult across its 
many variations. Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy of decisions in 
Haida Nation, Taku River and Mikisew Cree,1 the relationship between EA and 
the duty to consult has arisen in a number of cases and a clear picture is emerging 
of the steps that agencies conducting EAs must carry out in order to discharge 
their constitutional obligations to Aboriginal peoples.  
 
The relationship between EA and the duty to consult goes beyond a 
functional connection. Both are processes of reconciliation. EA has as its central 
purpose the generation of harmony between the natural environment and 
development activities; a process that requires balancing competing social goals 
and contested values.2 With the duty to consult, the goal of reconciliation seeks to 
achieve “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Haida	  Nation	  v.	  British	  Columbia	  (Minister	  of	  Forests),	  2004,	  SCC	  73,	  [Haida];	  Taku	  River	  Tlingit	  First	  
Nation	  v.	  British	  Columbia	  (Project	  Assessment	  Director),	  2004,	  SCC	  74,	  [Taku	  River];	  Mikisew	  Cree	  
First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Canadian	  Heritage),	  2005,	  SCC	  69,	  [Mikisew].	  2	  See	  for	  example,	  Canadian	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Act,	  2012,	  S.C.	  2012,	  c.	  19,	  s.	  52(4),	  [CEAA];	  The	  
National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act,	  U.S.C.	  1970,	  t.	  42	  c.	  55	  s.	  4321(101a),	  [NEPA].	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sovereignty of the Crown”.3 In practice, reconciliation in the Aboriginal law 
context requires balancing the rights and interests of Aboriginal groups with those 
of non-Aboriginals.4  
 
The common purpose of reconciliation leads to both processes sharing a 
similar structural form. Both are primarily procedural obligations, and can be 
discharged through careful attention to process considerations, such as notice, 
meaningful participation, and reasoned justification of decisions. The assumption 
that underlies both EA and the duty to consult is that by requiring decision-makers 
to consider the impacts of an activity on the natural environment or on the rights 
and interests of Aboriginal peoples, those interests will be accounted for and 
reflected in the outcome of the decision, notwithstanding the absence of formal 
substantive obligations to arrive at a particular result within either process.  
 
However, EA obligations and the duty to consult go beyond process. 
Neither is ambivalent about the outcomes its produces. The substantive aspect of 
EA is captured by the commitment to avoid “significant adverse environmental 
effects” caused by projects and activities subject to EA and to promote sustainable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Behn	  v.	  Moulton	  Contracting	  Ltd.,	  2013	  SCC	  26,	  [Behn],	  at	  para.	  28.	  4	  Taku	  River,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para.	  42	  (“…the	  Crown	  is	  bound	  by	  its	  honour	  to	  balance	  societal	  and	  Aboriginal	  interests	  in	  making	  decisions	  that	  may	  affect	  Aboriginal	  claims.”);Beckman	  et	  al.	  v.	  Little	  
Salmon/Carmacks	  First	  Nation,	  2010	  SCC	  53,	  para	  10,	  [Beckman];	  see	  also	  Deschamps	  J.	  at	  para	  103.	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development.5 The substantive aspect of Aboriginal consultation is expressed 
through the duty to accommodate, which is similarly defined as “taking steps to 
avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement”. 6  The 
substantive goals of EA are achieved indirectly by requiring that significant 
impacts be identified and disclosed. Mitigation is encouraged, but the structure of 
EA is such that the government may ultimately decide that the benefits of a 
project outweigh its environmental risks.7 Accommodation, on the other hand, 
has, formally at least, a different structure owing to its constitutional nature. The 
Crown’s discretion to subordinate Aboriginal interests to competing public goals 
is more constrained, and in cases of infringement of established rights, is subject 
to a high threshold of justification.8 
 
The principal aim of this article is to examine both the promise and 
limitations of using EA to implement the duties to consult and accommodate. At 
the heart of this inquiry is the extent to which careful attention to procedural 
requirements can bring about substantive ends.9 In particular, I consider the 
prospects of EA contributing to a “generative” process of constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.4.	  6	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  47.	  7	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  s.(4)(a).	  8	  Brian	  Slattery,	  “Aboriginal	  Rights	  and	  the	  Honour	  of	  the	  Crown”	  (2005),	  29	  S.C.L.R.(2d)	  233	  [Slattery],	  at	  436.	  9	  For	  a	  seminal	  exploration	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  process	  and	  substance	  in	  environmental	  law,	  see	  A.	  Dan	  Tarlock,	  “Is	  there	  a	  There	  There	  in	  Environmental	  Law?”	  (2004)	  19	  J.	  of	  Land	  Use	  and	  Envtl.	  L.	  213.	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redefinition; 10  which is to ask, to what extent can EA help build shared 
understandings among Aboriginal peoples and the Crown with respect to the 
evolving constitutional “compact” between the non-Aboriginal population and 
Aboriginal peoples?11  
 
The approach is principally descriptive in nature, and is intended to provide 
legal guidance to those persons engaged in EA processes that are being called 
upon to satisfy the duty to consult. I also put forward a normative argument. Here 
the central claim is that if EA is to successfully meet the underlying goal of 
reconciliation, then those engaged in EA processes must adopt an understanding 
of EA that recognizes that it is not simply a technical process of impact 
identification and assessment, but is also a process that has transformative 
potential. In effect, EA processes ought to be understood as having the potential 
for genuine deliberation. While the EA process does not dictate particular 
substantive outcomes, EA requirements do necessitate that the procedural 
conditions give rise to “meaningful” consultation and good faith, which I argue 
requires that the parties must be open to reconsidering their interests in light of the 
factual and normative information that emerges within the EA process, an 
objective that has to date been underappreciated by administrative officials and 
courts, but one that it integral to the duty to consult and accommodate. In effect, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Supra	  n.8	  at	  440,	  noting	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  has	  attributed	  a	  generative	  role	  to	  s.35;	  the	  SCC	  references	  this	  function	  in	  Rio	  Tinto	  at	  para	  38.	  11	  Beckman,	  supra	  n.4,	  Deschamps	  J.	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participation in and justification of decisions in light of mutually acceptable 
reasons provides greater opportunities for Aboriginal co-authorship of the policy 
decisions that effect their rights and interests, which in turn has the potential for 
both the Crown and Aboriginal groups to generate a set of shared normative 
expectations that lies at the heart of the notion of reconciliation. 
 
The paper proceeds in three parts. Part One considers the proceduralized 
nature of EA and the duty to consult. I examine the parallel structure of the two 
processes, but also how EA and the duty to consult diverge from one another. In 
Part Two, which forms the central focus of the paper, I look more specifically at 
stages of the EA process and how the duty to consult is being implemented 
through EA, and how Canadian courts understand the interaction between these 
processes. The focus here is on identifying the EA practices that are best able to 
satisfy the legal requirements and the aspirations of the duty to consult, as well as 
to identify areas that are likely to present challenges moving forward. Finally, in 
Part Three, I return to the theme of process and reconciliation, and more 
specifically to the prospects of process obligations to contribute to a renewed 
constitutional order. 
  
Part 1 The Duty to Consult and EA: The Turn to Process  
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a. The Duty to Consult and Accommodate  
 
The duty to consult as a distinct constitutional requirement was established 
in its present form by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Haida Nation and Taku 
River Tlingit First Nation cases and has been elaborated upon in three subsequent 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions; Mikisew Cree First Nation, Rio Tinto v. 
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, and Beckman et al. v. Little Salmon/Carmacks 
First Nation.12 The duty to consult arises out of the broader principle of the 
honour of Crown,13 which places a general duty on the Crown in their dealings 
with Aboriginal people to determine, recognize and respect the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples.14 In the context of treaty negotiation and interpretation, the 
honour of Crown requires the avoidance of ‘sharp dealing’ and imposes an 
overarching obligation of fairness on the Crown in their dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples. The honour of the Crown has been invoked in support of the obligation 
of the Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples in the face of infringements of 
established Aboriginal rights, with consultation becoming a critical consideration 
in determining whether a government action that infringes an established 
Aboriginal right is justified.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Haida,	  Taku	  River,	  supra	  note	  1,	  Mikisew,	  supra	  note	  1;	  Rio	  Tinto	  Alcan	  Inc.	  v.	  Carrier	  Sekani	  Tribal	  
Council,	  2010	  SCC	  43,	  [Rio	  Tinto];	  Beckman,	  supra	  note	  4.	  13	  See	  Slattery,	  supra	  note	  8;	  see	  also	  Isaac	  and	  Knox,	  “The	  Crown’s	  Duty	  to	  Consult	  Aboriginal	  People”	  (2003)	  41:1	  Alta.	  Law	  Rev.	  49.	  14	  Haida	  Nation,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  25.	  15	  R.	  v.	  Sparrow,	  1990,	  SCC	  104,	  [Sparrow],	  at	  1114.	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In Haida Nation, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the honour 
of the Crown extends the duty to consult to circumstances where Aboriginal rights 
are claimed, but are as yet unproven. Allowing the Crown to undertake activities 
in an unfettered manner where those activities may affect asserted, but unproven 
claims, would allow the Crown to potentially adversely affect the subject matter 
of ongoing negotiation.16 In these circumstances, the honour of the Crown serves 
to protect these contingent rights.17  
 
In Mikisew Cree, the question before the court was whether a Crown 
activity that was contemplated under a historic treaty, in this case, the taking up of 
surrendered land for road purposes, was nevertheless subject to the duty to 
consult. In holding that a duty to consult existed in these circumstances, the court 
maintains that the honour of the Crown does not come to an end once treaties are 
negotiated, as such the Crown in this case remained obligated to consult since its 
activities had potential adverse effects on the rights secured under the treaty. To 
hold otherwise would undermine the goal of reconciliation, which is understood 
by the court as a continual process, not as a destination that is reached upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Haida	  Nation,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  27.	  17	  Rio	  Tinto,	  supra	  note	  12	  at	  para.	  33:	  “The	  duty	  to	  consult…derives	  from	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  Aboriginal	  interests	  while	  land	  and	  resources	  and	  resource	  claims	  are	  ongoing	  or	  when	  the	  proposed	  action	  may	  impinge	  on	  a	  Aboriginal	  right.	  Absent	  this	  duty,	  Aboriginal	  groups	  seeking	  to	  protect	  their	  interests	  pending	  a	  final	  settlement	  would	  need	  to	  commence	  litigation	  and	  seek	  interlocutory	  injunctions	  to	  halt	  the	  threatening	  activity.”	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concluding a treaty. A point made clear by the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida 
Nation, where it noted: “Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual 
sense. Rather it is a process flowing from rights guaranteed by s.35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.”18 
 
Because the nature and strength of the Aboriginal claim will vary and the 
degree of impact from the government action will be dependent on the particular 
context of the activity in question, these requirements give rise to a duty that 
varies in its content. The Supreme Court has evoked the concept of a spectrum to 
illustrate how the content of the duty to consult varies: 
At one end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the 
Aboriginal right limited, or the potential infringement minor. In such cases the 
only duty on the Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, and 
discuss any issues raised in response to the notice. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum lie cases where a strong prima facie case for 
the claim is established, the right and potential infringement is of high 
significance to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk on non-compensable 
damage is high. In such cases deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory 
interim solution, may be required. While precise requirements will vary with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Haida	  Nation,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  32.	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the circumstances, the consultation required at this stage may entail the 
opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal participation in the 
decision-making process, and provision of written reasons to show that 
Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the impact they had on the 
decision.19 
The honour of the Crown not only demands adherence to procedural 
requirements, but it also imposes a duty to accommodate. This duty is triggered 
where the prima facie case for the Aboriginal claim is strong and the activity is 
likely to have “significant” adverse effects.20 While the trigger looks very much 
like the requirement for deep consultation, noted above, the duty to accommodate 
is best understood as a distinct obligation in the sense that a duty to consult at the 
lower end of the spectrum may still yield a obligation to accommodate, and an 
obligation for deep consultation will not necessarily require accommodation.21 
The duty to accommodate reveals itself through consultation,22 as a result any 
consultation to be meaningful must entertain the possibility of accommodation.23 
In Wii’litswx v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the court found that “An 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid	  at	  para	  43	  &	  44.	  20	  Ibid	  at	  para	  47.	  21	  See	  Ka'A'Gee	  Tu	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  2012	  FC	  297,	  [KTFN],	  para	  122:	  “The	  duty	  to	  accommodate	  is	  not	  a	  free-­‐standing	  legal	  right”.	  22	  Haida	  Nation,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  47;	  KTFN	  supra	  note	  21	  at	  para	  38:	  “the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of	  accommodation,	  if	  any,	  can	  only	  be	  ascertained	  after	  meaningful	  consultation.”	  23	  Mikisew,	  supra	  note	  1,	  para	  54.	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assessment of whether consultation was meaningful inevitably leads to an 
examination of what accommodations were reached”.24  
 
The precise content of the duty to accommodate remains ill-defined.25 The 
Supreme Court describes the duty as “taking steps to avoid irreparable harm or to 
minimize the effects of infringement”.26 In its guidelines, Aboriginal Consultation 
and Accommodation (2011), the Federal government notes, “The primary goal of 
accommodation is to avoid, eliminate, or minimize the adverse impacts on 
potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights, and when this is not possible, 
to compensate the Aboriginal community for those adverse impacts”.27 While the 
duty to accommodate is structured as a substantive right, the judicial treatment of 
the duty has severely curtailed its substantive effect by characterizing the duty as 
being satisfied through negotiation and compromise, as opposed to through the 
determination of formal legal rights: 
[A]ccommodation requires that Aboriginal concerns be balanced reasonably 
with the potential impact of the particular decision on those concerns and with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Wii’litswx	  v.	  British	  Columbia	  (Minister	  of	  Forests),	  2008	  BCSC	  1139	  [Wii’litswx]	  at	  para	  179.	  25	  Lorne	  Sossin,	  “The	  Duty	  to	  Consult	  and	  Accommodate”	  (2010)	  23	  C.J.A.L.P.	  93	  at	  107	  et	  seq.	  [Sossin];	  Dwight	  Newman,	  Revisiting	  The	  Duty	  to	  Consult	  Aboriginal	  Peoples	  (Saskatoon:	  Purich	  Publishing,	  2014)	  at	  59-­‐63,	  [Newman].	  26	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1,	  para	  47.	  	  27	  Aboriginal	  Consultation	  and	  Accommodation	  (2011)	  Minister	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Aboriginal	  Affairs	  and	  Northern	  Development	  Canada,	  Online	  <http://www.aadnc-­‐aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014664/1100100014675>,	  at	  p.54“consultation	  that	  excludes	  from	  the	  outset	  any	  form	  of	  accommodation	  would	  be	  meaningless”.	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competing societal concerns.  Compromise is inherent to the reconciliation 
process.28 
It follows that the duty to accommodate in the context of unproven or undefined 
Aboriginal rights does not include a veto. 29  The result is to conflate the 
substantive content of the duty to accommodate with a form of process obligation, 
a point alluded to by the Supreme Court: “Where consultation is meaningful, there 
is no ultimate duty to reach agreement”.30 The Court’s deference to government 
discretion in connection with this duty – the standard of review for determination 
of whether the duty to consult and accommodate has been fulfilled is 
reasonableness – is consonant with an understanding that these duties require 
political, as opposed to judicial, competencies.31 
 
b. Environmental Assessment 
 
Environmental assessment has become a central pillar of the environmental 
regulatory system in Canada and, indeed, globally.32 The logic of environment 
assessment is straightforward. Prior to making decisions that may have adverse 
impacts on the natural environment, decision makers should inform themselves of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Taku	  River,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  2.	  29	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  48.	  30	  Taku	  River,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  2.	  31	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  62.	  32	  Richard	  Morgan,	  “Environmental	  impact	  assessment:	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art”,	  (2012)	  30	  Impact	  Assessment	  and	  Project	  Appraisal	  5	  at	  5-­‐6	  (noting	  globalized	  nature	  of	  EIA	  processes).	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the potential environmental consequences of their decision, and should inform and 
consult other government agencies and the public. 33  In order to bring this 
examination about, environmental assessment legislation prescribes a set of 
procedural requirements that determine the level of scrutiny to which a project 
will be subject, the scope and content of the assessment itself, and the degree of 
public engagement.34 The procedural orientation of environmental assessment is 
captured by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Friends of Oldman River case, in 
which the Court describes EA in the following terms: 
Environmental impact assessment is, in its simplest form, a planning tool that 
is now generally regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making.  
As a planning tool it has both an information-gathering and decision-making 
component which provide the decision-makers with an objective basis for 
granting or denying approval for a proposed development. In short, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  essentialize	  EA,	  and	  different	  decision-­‐makers	  may	  seek	  to	  impose	  a	  more	  rigorous	  and	  sustainably-­‐oriented	  approach,	  emphasizing	  not	  only	  bio-­‐physical	  harm	  mitigation,	  but	  also	  seeking	  positive	  contributions	  to	  environmental,	  social	  and	  economic	  sustainability,	  see	  for	  example,	  Robert	  Gibson,	  “Favouring	  the	  Higher	  Test:	  Contribution	  to	  sustainability	  as	  the	  central	  criterion	  for	  reviews	  and	  decisions	  under	  the	  Canadian	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Act”	  (2000)	  10	  JELP	  39	  [Gibson].	  The	  discussion	  that	  follows	  focuses	  on	  the	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  approaches	  to	  EA	  processes	  in	  Canada,	  which	  have	  tended	  to	  emphasize	  harm	  mitigation.	  I	  return	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  more	  expansive	  understanding	  of	  EA	  in	  Part	  3.	  34	  Christopher	  Wood,	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment:	  A	  Comparative	  Review,	  2d.	  (New	  York,	  Routlege,	  2003);	  Jane	  Holder,	  Environmental	  Assessment:	  The	  Regulation	  of	  Decision	  Making	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  [Holder];	  Bram	  Noble,	  Introduction	  to	  Environmental	  Impact	  
Assessment:	  A	  Guide	  to	  Principles	  and	  Practice,	  2d	  ed.	  (Don	  Mills,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009).	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environmental impact assessment is simply descriptive of a process of 
decision-making.35 
 
The precise procedural requirements of EA are variable and responsive to 
the potential level of environmental harm, and can range from cursory reports 
prepared by proponents or authorizing agencies with little or no opportunities for 
direct consultation to hearings before independent tribunals who prepare 
recommendations for statutory decision-makers. The underlying logic is to match 
the procedural requirements with the degree of environment risk posed. 
 
As suggested by the Supreme Court, EA is not a regulatory instrument in 
the sense that EA legislation does not require adherence to pre-determined 
environmental outcomes in the manner that traditional command-and-control 
regulations, such as emission standards, do.36 That said, EA processes are very 
clearly intended to influence outcomes, and in this regard, EA legislation 
identifies substantive goals, such as the avoidance of significant environmental 
affects and the promotion of sustainable development. 37  However, the 
environmental goals to which EA is directed are only identified in such broad 
terms, that, on their own, they can fairly be said to constrain government activity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Friends	  of	  the	  Oldman	  River	  Society	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Transport),	  1992	  SCC	  110	  at	  para	  95;	  see	  also	  MiningWatch	  Canada	  v.	  Canada	  (Fisheries	  and	  Oceans),	  2010	  SCC	  2	  at	  para	  14.	  36	  Richard	  Stewart,	  “A	  New	  Generation	  of	  Environmental	  Regulation”	  (2001)	  29	  Capital	  University	  L.	  Rev.	  21	  at	  140-­‐41	  (describing	  EIA	  processes	  as	  a	  form	  of	  reflexive	  law).	  37	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  s.4.	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very little. Ultimately, even where an EA discloses significant environmental 
impacts, it remains open for the government to proceed with the activity in 
question. The U.S. Supreme Court captured the procedural dynamic of EA where 
it noted that the National Environmental Policy Act, which contains the U.S. 
federal EA obligations, “merely prohibits uninformed – rather than unwise – 
agency action”.38  
 
It would be an oversimplification of EA, however, to view it in purely 
procedural terms. The premise behind EA is that informed and open attention to 
adverse environmental effects will result in environmentally benign decision-
making, as public officials will seek to adhere to the identified public purposes of 
EA legislation. Public participation, which is an essential part of EA, serves as 
both an informational tool, insofar as members of the public can identify 
environmental and social impacts, and an accountability tool. Decision-makers are 
required to justify their decisions in light of the environmental impacts and in 
light of the specific concerns raised by members of the public. Despite the SCC’s 
characterization of EA as supplying an “objective basis” for decisions, which 
suggests a purely technical role, EA is understood by many commentators as 
having political and normative dimensions.39 The consultative nature of EA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Robertson	  v.	  Methow	  Valley	  Citizens	  Council,	  490	  U.S.	  332,	  350-­‐51	  (1989)	  39	  Serge	  Taylor,	  Making	  Bureaucracies	  Think:	  The	  Environmental	  Impact	  Statement	  Strategy	  of	  
Administrative	  Reform	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  [Taylor];	  Robert	  Bartlett	  &	  Priya	  Kurian,	  “The	  Theory	  of	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment:	  Implicit	  Models	  of	  Policy	  Making”	  (1999)	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provides opportunity for agencies and the public to bring power and influence to 
bear on decisions, while the justificatory nature of EA requires that decisions be 
justified in light of substantive normative criteria.  
 
c. Understanding the Turn to Process 
 
The key point of connection between the duty to consult and EA is the turn 
to process as the primary approach to addressing substantive goals, with parallels 
in both the structure of the process and the underlying justification for preferring 
procedural obligations. First, both the duty to consult and EA are primarily 
concerned with government decision-making and involve public duties. For the 
duty to consult, the focus on government arises from the special relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. In some instances, the courts have 
characterized this relationship as a fiduciary duty, but more generally, the 
relationship is captured by the more flexible concept of the honour of the 
Crown. 40  The government’s relationship to the public in relation to the 
environment arises not from a special relationship, but from the status of the 
natural environment as a public good. As such, the courts have recognized that 
safeguarding the public interest in the environment is the responsibility of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27:4	  Policy	  and	  Politics	  415	  [Bartlett	  &	  Kurian];	  Neil	  Craik,	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  Environmental	  
Impact	  Assessment:	  Process,	  Substance	  and	  Integration	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  [Craik].	  40	  See	  Wewaykum	  Indian	  Band	  v.	  Canada,	  2003	  SCC	  45	  at	  para	  81.	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Crown, giving rise, for example, to the right of the Crown to recover damages for 
pure environmental loss. 41  While the Crown’s obligation regarding the 
environment does not formally constitute a trust, there is a trust-like dimension 
that draws parallels with the duty to consult.42 In both cases, the Crown is 
understood as the steward of resources, the benefit of which accrues to others. 
This in turn requires, as a minimum, that the Crown discharge its stewardship 
obligations in good faith. In both cases, because the responsibility resides with the 
Crown, and not on a private party, such as a resource developer, the obligations 
relate to the Crown’s conduct and are triggered by the actions of the Crown.43  
 
Since both EA and the duty to consult engage administrative discretion, the 
Crown is required to exercise that discretion with reference to public values.44  In 
relation to EA, these values are expressed in EA legislation, and relate to public 
goals of sustainability, environmental protection and meaningful public 
engagement.45 The public goals of the duty to consult are the recognition and 
accommodation of Aboriginal rights, which is framed as a public value through 
the honour of the Crown. In both cases, however, these underlying substantive 
goals are open-textured and only cognizable with reference to specific contexts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  British	  Columbia	  v.	  Canadian	  Forest	  Products	  Ltd.,	  2004	  SCC	  38	  [Canfor]	  at	  para	  72-­‐83.	  42	  Ibid,	  but	  note	  that	  the	  Court	  in	  Canfor	  does	  not	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  Crown	  can	  be	  held	  legally	  responsible	  for	  breach	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  event	  of	  government	  failure	  to	  protect	  the	  environment,	  see	  para	  81-­‐82.	  43	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.5	  –	  triggers.	  	  44	  Roncarelli	  v.	  Duplessis,	  1959	  SCC	  50.	  45	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.4.	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One might suppose that EA processes would become redundant in the face 
of specific standards governing air and water pollution, toxic substances, waste 
management, biological diversity and endangered species protection, as well as 
land use controls.46 However, in Canada, and elsewhere, EA laws persist in the 
face of substantive environmental law. One reason why EAs have not become 
superfluous in the face of growing substantive environmental rules is that the 
avoidance of significant environmental harm, particularly from large and complex 
undertakings, is difficult to determine in the abstract. For example, most EA 
legislation recognizes the importance of cumulative impacts from multiple 
sources, something for which it is harder to develop standards.47 Ecosystem and 
related social impacts are often the result of the interaction of environmental and 
social components, which again requires a more holistic approach. Adherence to 
standards also does not adequately inform decision-makers whether the social and 
economic trade-offs associated with an activity are justifiable – a determination 
that is again highly context specific.  
 
The need for contextual decision-making is also integral to government 
decisions affecting Aboriginal interests. The particular circumstances relating to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Michael	  Herz,	  “Parallel	  Universes:	  NEPA	  Lessons	  for	  the	  New	  Property”	  (1993)	  93	  Columbia	  L.Rev.	  1668	  at	  1682-­‐83	  (noting	  that	  under	  NEPA	  there	  is	  an	  important	  separation	  between	  the	  presence	  of	  substantive	  standards	  and	  EIA	  commitments).	  47	  Since	  standards	  tend	  to	  be	  facility	  specific.	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the strength of the claim and the potential for infringement will vary on a case-by-
case basis. So too will the government’s interests in the potentially harmful 
activity.48  A set of clear substantive rules respecting accommodation is not 
possible as the duties to consult and accommodate necessarily respond to the 
particular facts at hand. The relationship between the duties to consult and 
accommodate is further complicated by the fact that the presence of a substantive 
duty cannot be determined ex ante, since part of the purpose of the duty to consult 
is explore whether there is a duty to accommodate. As currently described by the 
courts, the duty to accommodate has a kind of twilight existence. It does not give 
rise, at least in a formal sense, to a right of consent.49 But adherence to procedural 
duties alone will not satisfy the duty to accommodate, which requires by 
definition efforts to address Aboriginal concerns.50 Like the decision that must be 
made in EA, the duty to accommodate requires a balancing of competing 
interests.51  
 
Proceduralization is a product of the need for contextual decision-making, 
but it is also recognition of the political content of the underlying goals.52 Since 
the decisions being undertaken involve the balancing of different interests that are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Mikisew,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  para	  63.	  49	  But	  in	  the	  case	  of	  proven	  claims,	  see	  Tsilhqot’in	  Nation	  v.	  British	  Columbia,	  2014	  SCC	  44,	  discussing	  obligation	  of	  the	  Crown	  where	  Aboriginal	  title	  is	  demonstrated.	  50	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  para	  49.	  51	  Ibid	  at	  para	  50:	  “the	  Crown	  must	  balance	  Aboriginal	  concerns	  reasonably	  with	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  asserted	  right	  or	  title	  and	  with	  other	  societal	  interests.”	  52	  See	  Gunther	  Teubner,	  “How	  The	  Law	  Thinks:	  Toward	  A	  Constructivist	  Epistemology	  Of	  Law”	  (1989)	  23:5	  Law	  and	  Soc’y	  Rev.	  727.	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traditionally left to the political branches of government, the recourse to procedure 
structures the nature of these interactions but not the content of the outcome.53 
Accommodation is a process of “balance and compromise” between Aboriginal 
groups and the Crown. Reconciliation, which is the underlying goal of the duty to 
consult and accommodate, ought to be a product of negotiation not litigation. 54 
The turn to procedure respects the primacy of the political branches in the 
reconciliation process.  
 
Acknowledgement of the political nature of the decision-making process is 
also evident within EA processes. The decision to proceed with an activity is left 
to the discretion of the responsible agency, which must account for the results of 
the EA, but is not bound by it. While substantive norms shape the political process 
by creating burdens of justification on government decision-makers, agencies 
retain control over the exercise of this discretion.55 Process does not serve to take 
politics out of the decision-making process, but rather requires that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  David	  Dyzenhaus	  &	  Evan	  Fox-­‐Decent,	  “Rethinking	  the	  process/substance	  distinction:	  Baker	  v.	  Canada”	  (2001)	  51:3	  U.T.L.J.	  193	  [Dyzenhaus	  &	  Fox-­‐Decent].	  54	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  para	  14;	  Rio	  Tinto,	  supra	  note	  12	  at	  para	  38,	  consultation	  “seeks	  to	  further	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  reconciliation	  by	  articulating	  a	  preference	  for	  remedies	  “that	  promote	  ongoing	  negotiations”;	  see	  also	  Beckman,	  supra	  note	  4	  at	  para	  103,	  Deschamps J. makes this point noting: the 
“objective of reconciliation of course presupposes active participation by Aboriginal peoples in the 
negotiation of treaties, as opposed to a necessarily more passive role and an antagonistic attitude in the 
context of constitutional litigation.”	  55	  The	  identity	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  varies	  from	  system	  to	  system,	  ranging	  from	  individual	  administrative	  delegates	  to	  cabinet	  level	  decision-­‐makers.	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government engage in a form of decision-making that is transparent, participatory 
and justificatory.56 
 
Both sets of obligations blur the distinction between process and substance 
by imposing an informal substantive legal rationality on the decision-making 
process. The principles that guide the exercise of authority are substantive in the 
sense that they are intended to influence the outcome of the decisions. EA 
processes are, for example, meant to result in the avoidance of adverse 
environmental impacts. Decisions that engage the duty to consult are intended to 
lead to the avoidance of adverse impacts to those interests. The substantive 
obligations, owing to their inchoate and contextual nature, find expression in the 
commitment to principled decision-making through the requirement for 
justification in light of shared substantive values. The standard of review of the 
adequacy of this justification is reasonableness, which recognizes the superior 
position of the original decision-maker to assess the application of principles to 
the often-complex factual context. 57  While not subject to strict judicial 
supervision, normative justification is nonetheless constraining in that it reduces 
the available courses of action open to the government. The public nature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Craik,	  supra	  note	  39	  at	  280.	  57	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1;	  see	  also	  Sossin,	  supra	  note	  25.	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justification contributes to the substantive constraints because the acceptance or 
non-acceptance of the reasons put forward can contribute to political authority.58 
 
There is a strong emphasis on good faith within both processes. Good faith 
does not require that the government abandon its own interests in favour of those 
potentially affected by its decisions, but it does require a demonstration that the 
government make a genuine attempt to understand the interests of other parties 
and to assure those parties that their views have been accounted for. While good 
faith is largely determined with reference to how decisions were undertaken, there 
is also a substantive element that requires that the reasons given in order to 
demonstrate that the decision taken accords with the objectives of the respective 
obligations.  
 
The turn to process also reflects a more sociological understanding of how 
process obligations may influence substantive outcomes. Both EA and the duty to 
consult would appear to embrace the possibility that adherence to procedural 
requirements will result in social learning by the participants with the potential to 
internalize shared norms.59 By creating conditions that make genuine deliberation 
possible, participants may reconsider their interests in light of factual and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Dyzenhaus	  &	  Fox-­‐Decent,	  supra	  note	  53.	  59	  See,	  for	  example,	  John	  Sinclair	  and	  Alan	  Diduck,	  “Public	  Involvement	  in	  EA	  in	  Canada:	  A	  Transformative	  Learning	  Perspective”	  (2001)	  21	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment	  Rev.	  113;	  see	  also	  Robert	  Bartlett,	  Rationality	  and	  the	  Logic	  of	  the	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act”	  (1986)	  8	  Envt’l	  Professional	  105.	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normative information. EA was developed in part as a response to the failure of 
public agencies to consider environmental matters in the exercise of their 
discretion.60 EA underscored the idea that environmental considerations ought to 
form a part of all good public decision-making. Similarly, the duty to consult 
responded to the failure of the Crown and the courts (in injunction proceedings) to 
properly account for Aboriginal interests in government decisions. 61 
Internalization of norms is not guaranteed, and the supposed transformational 
effects of process are the subject of criticism in both EA and the duty to consult.62 
Nonetheless, the stated goal of both processes remains one of integrating 
competing sets of values into a shared vision, best captured in the concept of 
sustainable development that underlies EA and Justice Binnie’s description of 
reconciliation as leading to “a mutually respectful long-term relationship.63 
 
Despite these similarities, there are also important differences in the nature 
of these obligations. The environmental interests that EA addresses are the 
interests that all citizens share in relation to the natural environment. EA 
originated in part as an acknowledgement that all citizens have an interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Lynton	  Caldwell,	  “Beyond	  NEPA:	  Future	  Significance	  of	  the	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act”	  (1998)	  22	  Harvard	  Envt’l	  L.	  Rev.	  203.	  61	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  para	  14.	  62	  Joseph	  Sax,	  “The	  (Unhappy)	  Truth	  about	  NEPA”	  26	  Oklahoma	  LR	  (1973)	  239	  [Sax];	  Newman,	  supra	  note	  25	  at	  105.	  63	  Binnie	  J.	  in	  Beckman,	  supra	  note	  4	  at	  para	  10;	  NEPA,	  supra	  note	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  101:	  “goal	  of	  sustainability”.	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maintaining environmental resources.64 Because these interests are shared, they 
are what I would classify as “stakeholder” interests. Individuals derive benefit 
from environmental resources, but they have no specific common law rights, 
beyond private property interests.65 The environmental interests protected through 
EA are subsumed as part of the broader public interest. As a consequence, the 
interests protected are not superior to other elements of public interest, and may 
be traded-off against other public priorities, including development interests. In 
recognition of the government’s superior position in determining the public 
interest, courts have granted agencies implementing EA rules broad discretion to 
determine how best to balance competing interests. 
 
The interests protected by the duty to consult are of a different character. 
The difficulty is that the character is variable depending upon the strength of 
claim. At the high end, where the interests are either proven rights or rights that 
possess high prima facie strength, the rights cannot be easily traded off. Given 
their constitutional nature they are in effect superior to other public interests. This 
does not make those rights absolute, but it does require compelling and 
substantive reasons to justify infringement.66 Even in cases where the strength of 
claim is lower, the interests remain underlain by the potential existence of a 
future, proven right. The potential and underlying substantive content that attaches 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  NEPA,	  supra	  note	  2.	  65	  Canfor,	  supra	  note	  41.	  66	  Sparrow,	  supra	  note	  15	  at	  1113.	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to Aboriginal interests is significant across the entire spectrum of the duty to 
consult because it is through the duty to consult that the nature of the interests 
reveals itself, as a result, the process always operates in the shadow of substantive 
Aboriginal rights.  
 
Unlike environmental interests, Aboriginal rights, which are held 
collectively by an identifiable group, are defined oppositionally to the “broader 
community as a whole”.67   Whereas environmental interest can be entirely 
subordinated to other public interests, such as economic development, Aboriginal 
rights, which are constitutionally protected and independent of Crown authority, 
cannot be so easily subordinated. Since the duty to consult is oriented towards the 
reconciliation of “prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of 
Canadian sovereignty”,68 the Crown must temper the exercise of its sovereignty 
with the rights of self-determination and cultural self-expression that inhere in the 
fact of prior occupation.  
 
Part 2 – Implementing the Duty to Consult through Environmental 
Assessment 
 
a. Defining the Relationship between EA and the Duty to Consult 	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  R.	  v.	  Gladstone,	  1996	  SCC	  160,	  [Gladstone],	  para	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  68Haida,	  supra	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  at	  para	  26.	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The question of whether the Crown could implement the duty to consult 
through its existing EA processes arose in the Taku River Tlingit First Nation case 
that was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada with Haida Nation in 2004.69 
In that case, which concerned a proposal to build a road through the Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation’s (TRTFN) traditional lands, TRTFN had participated in an 
environmental assessment process for the road under British Columbia’s 
Environmental Assessment Act.70 The SCC found that TRTFN was entitled to 
consultation in the middle to high range of the spectrum, allowing “TRTFN was 
entitled to something significantly deeper than minimum consultation under the 
circumstances, and to a level of responsiveness to its concerns that can be 
characterized as accommodation”.71  
 
Under the B.C. process in place at the time, the EA process is coordinated 
through a Project Committee, on which TRTFN participated. Through that 
process, TRTFN had an opportunity to review the many reports and studies 
produced in support of the project, and it was able to voice its concerns with the 
project as proposed. Ultimately, the project was recommended for approval, 
although TRTFN had outstanding concerns. TRTFN appealed the decision on the 
basis that the EA process was an inadequate form of consultation. The SCC found 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Taku	  River,	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para.	  70	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Act,	  SBC	  2002,	  ch.	  43,	  s.	  	  29.1.	  71	  Taku	  River,	  supra	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  at	  para	  32.	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that the EA process fulfilled the requirements of the duty to consult in this 
instance.72 
 
The principal legal finding of the court was that the duty to consult does not 
require the development of special consultation measures, but rather can be 
satisfied through existing schemes, such as the EA process.73 In coming to this 
conclusion, the Court was careful to review in considerable detail the specific 
elements of the scheme. Given the variability the duty to consult and EA 
processes, courts will be required to look behind the particular scheme to ensure 
that its application meets the requirements of the level of consultation that must be 
afforded in the circumstances. In this case, while the duty was determined to be 
near the high end of the spectrum, the particulars of the EA scheme satisfied that 
onus. Of salience in this regard were the following features of the EA scheme: 
• That TRTFN participated directly as a member of the Project Committee 
(a statutory requirement); 
• TRTFN was provided with financial assistance to facilitate its 
participation; 
• Numerous meetings with officials and the consultants preparing the EA 
were held with the TRTFN to discuss TRTFN’s concern; 
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  Ibid	  at	  paras	  22,	  40.	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  Ibid	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• On several occasions time extensions were granted to allow TRTFN more 
time to respond to information; 
• TRTFN’s concerns were set out in the Project Report and “meaningfully 
discussed”; 
• The Report included mitigation strategies to address TRTFN’s concerns, 
which were adopted into the project approval conditions; 
• There were further opportunities for TKFN’s concerns to be addressed 
through the permitting process for the project.74 
 
Matching the requirements of the duty to consult with the EA process, the 
key elements of the EA process were that TRTFN were provided with notice, full 
disclosure of the project details and impacts, TRTFN were given ample 
opportunity to understand how their interests were affected, and to voice their 
concerns and have those concerns responded to meaningfully. The presence of 
mitigation measures that sought to address TRTFN’s concerns was understood by 
the court as a form of accommodation.75 The Court notes that the EA process 
itself was adapted to meet the concerns of TRTFN.76 The Taku River case should 
be understood to stand for the proposition that the duty to consult may be 
implemented through EA in principle, but each case will be determined on its own 
merits in light of the particulars of the actual process carried out and the level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Ibid	  at	  paras	  3,	  37,	  38,	  11,	  41,	  44,	  46.	  75	  Ibid	  at	  para	  44.	  76	  Ibid	  at	  para.	  2.	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consultation and accommodation demanded in the circumstances. It should also be 
noted that the British Columbia EA process in place at the time the Taku River 
case was decided provided for a high level of engagement that is not present in 
other jurisdictions, and has since been amended in British Columbia.77 
 
The issue of EAs was also raised incidentally in the Haida Nation case, 
where the SCC in its discussion of the duty on third parties (particularly project 
proponents) indicated that while the duty to consult in toto cannot be delegated, 
the “Crown may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry 
proponents seeking a particular development; this is not infrequently done in 
environmental assessments”.78 The distinction that the Court is making between 
“procedural” and other non-procedural aspects of consultation is not entirely clear, 
particularly in light of the process-oriented nature of the duty as a whole. 
However, if viewed in light of the Taku River case, the EA process provides for a 
delegation to industry proponents of the conduct of the study, subject to defined 
terms of reference. It is not uncommon through this process for the proponent 
(typically through a consultant) to engage the public and other agencies in 
defining the scope of the study, understanding the concerns of the public and, 
where appropriate, recommending mitigation measures to address those concerns. 
At the end of this process, the findings are communicated (usually in a report) to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Act,	  SBC	  2002,	  c.43.	  (The	  Taku	  River	  case	  considered	  the	  process	  under	  the	  prior	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Act,	  RSBC	  1996,	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the statutory decision maker. In the Taku River case, the recommendations were 
made to the Executive Director of the EA division, who then makes a 
recommendation to the Minister. As a result, the Crown, through the Minister, 
was ultimately responsible for the approval, and the Minister had before him or 
her a full record of the concerns of TRTFN and the measures of how they were 
addressed. 
 
The issue of the adequacy of EA has arisen in subsequent cases. In 
Ka’A’Gee Tu First Nation v. Canada, the adequacy of regulatory processes, 
including the EA process was contested by the KTFN.79 In its decision, the 
Federal Court confirmed that EA processes could satisfy the duty to consult, but 
that process must provide meaningful consultation throughout the approvals 
process. At issue in the case was a modification to the project that occurred after 
the consultation with the KTFN. While the process on the original proposal was 
the subject of adequate consultation, the Crown could not unilaterally modify the 
project without providing KTFN with a further opportunity to have input on the 
modified activity.80 The process undertaken was in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, which did not require further consultation on modifications, but the 
Federal Court found the process failed to satisfy the duty to consult, noting that it 
is not enough to rely on a statutory process. The Crown’s constitutional duty must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  KTFN,	  supra	  note	  21	  at	  para	  30.	  	  80	  Ibid	  at	  para	  120,	  124.	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take precedence. In the Court’s words, “the Crown’s duty to consult cannot be 
boxed in by legislation”.81  
 
The judicial consensus that is emerging is that statutory processes designed 
to satisfy other regulatory requirements, such as EA, may satisfy the duty to 
consult, so long as “in substance an appropriate level of consultation is 
provided”. 82  In cases where the statutory process on its own is adequate, 
Aboriginal groups cannot insist on a separate and discrete consultation process 
with the Crown.83 In one case, the Court goes so far as to say that where statutory 
process are accessible and adequate, Aboriginal groups have a “responsibility to 
use them”.84 This is more likely to occur at the low end of the consultation 
spectrum. Where consultation requirements are more onerous, as in the Taku 
River and Ka’A’Gee Tu First Nation cases, the statutory processes may need to be 
adjusted, or supplemented, in order to meet the constitutional requirements.85 This 
is not an insignificant challenge, as there are high degrees of variability in what 
the duty to consult will require in each instance, and in the manner by which the 
EA is structured along side other regulatory approval processes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Ka’a’Gee	  Tu	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  2007	  FC	  763	  at	  para	  121.	  82	  Beckman,	  supra	  note	  4	  at	  para	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  see	  also	  Conseil	  des	  innus	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  2013	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  well	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  practice	  that	  Crown	  consultation	  can	  take	  place	  through	  CEAA’s	  EA	  process.”).	  83	  Brokenhead	  Ojibway	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  2009	  FC	  484	  [Brokenhead]	  at	  para	  42.	  84	  Ibid.	  85	  Taku	  River,	  supra	  note	  1;	  KTFN,	  supra	  note	  81;	  see	  also	  Ka’a’Gee	  Tu	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Attorney	  
General),	  supra	  note	  21	  at	  para	  112	  (describing	  and	  finding	  that	  the	  process	  prescribed	  in	  the	  2007	  KTFN	  case	  was	  meaningful).	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One further aspect of the relationship between the duty to consult and EA is 
that even where an alternative consultation process is contemplated, the Crown 
may nevertheless have an obligation to ensure that there is adequate consultation 
within the EA. In Nlaka’pamex	  Nation	  Tribal	  Council	   v.	  British	  Columbia, the 
statutory process for determining the terms of reference for an EA process, 
including which groups had to be consulted as part of the EA process, excluded 
the NNTC.86 The Environmental Assessment Office did propose consultations 
outside of the EA process, but the BCCA held that “denying the NNTC a role 
within the assessment process is denying it access to an important part of the high-
level planning process”, and as such consultation outside the EA process could 
not be a “substitute for consultations within the assessment process itself”.87 The 
Crown had argued that in the circumstances, the proposed form of consultation 
was most efficient and that it was simply seeking to “balance its obligation to 
consult with its obligation to carry out its statutory duty in an effective manner”.88 
As in other cases, however, the Court recognized that the constitutional duty took 
priority and that efficiency rationales could not be used to compromise the duty to 
consult.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Nlaka’pamex	  Nation	  Tribal	  Council	  v.	  British	  Columbia,	  2011	  BCCA	  78	  [NNTC].	  87	  Ibid	  at	  para	  97.	  88	  Ibid	  at	  para	  68.	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This decision points to the inseparability of EA from the duty to consult. 
What the court recognized here was that key aspects of the project would be 
determined through the EA process, and by separating consultation from that 
process, the consultations could not be meaningful, as they where disengaged 
from the broader decision-making process that could affect Aboriginal rights. The 
practical implication of the NNTC case is that even where the Crown is engaged 
in parallel consultations, it must consider whether other regulatory processes may 
influence Aboriginal rights, in which case the Crown is likely obligated to provide 
appropriate levels of consultation within those regulatory processes. 
 
This connection may work both ways in that where Aboriginal consultations 
result in major project changes, the revised project may need to be the object of 
additional public participation through the EA process. Because the Crown must 
balance its obligations to Aboriginal peoples with other public interest concerns, it 
may face restrictions in its ability to consult with Aboriginal groups to the 
exclusion of other interested parties. These latter interests may trigger 
administrative law protections, but in the EA context, are most likely addressed 
through statutory public participation requirements. 
 
b. Current Government Practices 
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The federal and provincial governments have indicated a clear preference to 
use environmental assessment processes where they apply to fulfill the duty to 
consult, and have increasingly institutionalized their approach in government 
policy. For example, the federal government’s guide to Aboriginal Consultation 
and Accommodations: Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the 
Duty to Consult, states that “The Government of Canada will use and rely on, 
where appropriate, existing consultation mechanisms, processes and expertise, 
such as environmental assessment and regulatory approval processes in which 
Aboriginal consultation will be integrated, to coordinate decision making and will 
assess if additional consultation activities may be necessary”.89 The approach 
seeks, as far as practical, to integrate the duty to consult with the EA process, and 
with regulatory processes. In order to coordinate this process across the various 
departments of the federal government, the Guidelines identify the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency as the Crown consultation coordinator, and 
clarifies the roles of other participants, such as other responsible authorities, 
proponents, and other regulatory agencies in the EA process.90 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  Aboriginal	  Consultation	  and	  Accommodation:	  Updated	  Guidelines	  for	  Federal	  
Officials	  to	  Fulfill	  the	  Duty	  to	  Consult	  (March	  2011)	  <http://www.aadnc-­‐aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014664/1100100014675>	  [Federal	  Guidelines]	  at	  14.	  90	  Ibid.	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Provincial governments have likewise sought to integrate consultation 
within their EA processes.91 In a number of cases, the provincial guidelines 
explicitly incorporate directions to project proponents to carry out the “procedural 
aspects of consultation”.92 For example, the BC Guide to Involving Proponents 
when Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process 
explicitly identify those areas which are “procedural aspects” of consultation, and 
those which cannot be delegated. The areas subject to delegation include: 
• Providing information about the proposed project to First Nations 
early in planning process; 
• Obtaining and discussing information about specific Aboriginal 
Interests that may be impacted with First Nations; 
• Considering modifications to plans to avoid or mitigate impacts to 
Aboriginal Interests; and 
• Documenting engagement, specific Aboriginal Interests that may 
be impacted and any modifications to address concerns and 
providing this record to EAO. 
While the following decisions remain the responsibility of the Crown: 
• The strength of a First Nation’s claimed Aboriginal Rights or Title 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Province	  of	  British	  Columbia,	  Guide	  to	  Involving	  Proponents	  when	  Consulting	  First	  Nations	  in	  the	  
Environmental	  Assessment	  Process	  (2014)	  <http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/DownloadAsset?assetId=E7440CDF3C864AA8B63D48EA79D37BA1>	  [BC	  Guide];	  Province	  of	  Saskatchewan,	  Guidelines	  for	  Engaging	  and	  Consulting	  with	  First	  Nations	  and	  
Métis	  Communities	  in	  Relation	  to	  Environmental	  Assessment	  in	  Saskatchewan	  (June	  2014)	  <http://www.environment.gov.sk.ca/EAProponentConsultationGuidelines>	  [Saskatchewan	  Guide].	  92	  Ibid.	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• Whether Crown decisions regarding a proposed project represents 
potential infringements of Treaty rights; and 
• The adequacy of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate.93 
 
In addition to general guidelines, governments have developed consultation 
frameworks on a case-by-case basis. For example, the federal government has 
developed Aboriginal Consultation Frameworks setting out how the federal 
government will conduct consultation in the context of complex regulatory 
proceedings involving administrative tribunals, such as review panels under the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.94 The role of tribunals in satisfying the 
duty to consult was considered in Beckman, and some of the complications as they 
relate to EA proceedings are discussed below. The practice that is emerging is to 
distribute consultation activities across different phases of the approvals process 
and use the hearing process as the central vehicle for consultation, although 
inserting opportunities for direct consultation with the Crown.95 The result in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  BC	  Guide,	  supra	  note	  91	  at	  3;	  see	  also	  the	  Responsible	  Energy	  Development	  Act,	  SA	  2012,	  c.R-­‐17.3,	  s.21,	  (preventing	  regulator	  from	  assessing	  adequacy	  of	  Crown	  consultation).	  94	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  Aboriginal	  Consultation	  Framework	  for	  the	  Northern	  Gateway	  Pipeline	  
Project	  (n.d.)	  <http://www.ceaa-­‐acee.gc.ca/050/documents/44761/44761E.pdf>	  [Northern	  
Gateway];	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  Federal	  Aboriginal	  Consultation	  Framework	  for	  the	  Lower	  Churchill	  
Hydroelectric	  Generation	  Project	  (August,	  2010)	  <	  http://www.ceaa-­‐acee.gc.ca/050/documents/44761/44761E.pdf>.	  95	  For example, in the approvals process for the Northern Gateway pipeline, which required both an EA and 
approval of the National Energy Board, the Consultation Framework identified five distinct phases: Phase I 
- involving initial engagement of potentially affected Aboriginal groups and consulting on the development 
of the Joint Review Panel process; Phase II – involving the lead to the JRP, where information is 
exchanged among the parties; Phase Three – the hearing itself, including the preparation by the JRP of its 
reports and recommendations, which may include recommendations aimed at accommodation, but may not 
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these cases is a separation between the “procedural aspects” of the duty from the 
decision itself. This has lead governments to restrict the mandates of some 
consultation bodies by preventing those bodies from making determinations of the 
strength of claim and from assessing the adequacy of the Crown’s fulfillment of 
the duty to consult.96 
 
c. Specific Implementation Issues 
 
i. Application and Screening 
 
Picking up on the point above, the Crown will need to make a determination 
as to whether a regulatory process engages the duty to consult and at which point 
within that process consultation ought to be commenced. Within EA processes, 
the initial determinations of whether an EA shall be conducted and, if so, what 
form the EA shall take, are referred to as screening processes. Under current 
federal rules, the determination of whether an EA should be conducted is a 
decision that involves nearly unconstrained discretion, 97  but under prior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
include determinations as the strength of Aboriginal claims or the adequacy of consultation; Phase IV – 
consultation with the Crown Consultation Coordinator on the JRP EA report, which is reported to the 
Cabinet, who makes a determination  on the government’s response to the JRP report; and Phase 5 – 
involving additional consultation on further regulatory approvals. Northern Gateway Framework	  96	  Northern	  Gateway,	  supra	  note	  94.	  97	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.10.	  
	   Process	  and	  Reconciliation	  
37	  	  
legislation a full EA was triggered where a project was determined to have a 
likelihood of having a significant environmental impact.98 
 
The basic rule respecting when the duty to consult arises was stated in 
Haida Nation as occurring “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, 
of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct 
that might adversely affect it”. 99  The obligation, which relates to Crown 
“conduct”, is much broader than the application of EA, which is typically 
restricted to physical projects.100 The different scope of application has led to 
some difficult practical questions about when consultation needs to be engaged. 
One source of difficulty is that project planning processes are not necessarily 
discrete activities, but rather occur in the context of other enabling decisions on 
policies and programs.  
 
This issue first arose in the Haida Nation case, which involved the granting 
of a tree farm licence. The tree farm licence did not authorize the harvesting of 
trees, which required further permits. The B.C. government argued that while it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Canadian	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Act,	  S.C.	  1992,	  c.	  37	  [CEAA	  1992],	  s.20,	  (under	  CEAA	  1992	  a	  comprehensive	  EA	  was	  required	  for	  projects	  identified	  by	  regulation,	  but	  where	  not	  specifically	  included	  in	  regulation	  a	  screening	  EA	  was	  conducted,	  which	  if	  indicated	  a	  likelihood	  of	  significant	  effect	  (or	  if	  uncertain	  about	  impacts	  or	  public	  concerns	  warranted)	  would	  require	  the	  responsible	  authority	  to	  refer	  the	  project	  to	  mediation	  or	  a	  review	  panel).	  Pursuant	  to	  s.5,	  Federal	  EAs	  apply	  only	  to	  activities	  that	  involve	  identified	  federal	  “triggers”.	  99	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  35.	  100	  See,	  for	  example,	  definition	  of	  “project”	  in	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  s.	  2(1)	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did not consult at the stage of granting the tree farm licence, it intended to consult 
prior to the issuance of cutting permits. In holding that the duty to consult applies 
to the tree farm licence, the Court recognized that the strategic level decision 
strongly influenced the subsequent outcomes, and leaving consultation to a later 
stage would prevent meaningful consultation.101 The extension of the duty to 
consult to “strategic, higher level decisions” was confirmed by the Supreme Court 
in the Rio Tinto case, which noted that the duty ought include decisions respecting 
higher-level or structural changes to resource management schemes as those 
changes may “set the stage for further decisions that will have a direct adverse 
impact on land and resources”.102 
 
A form of strategic planning is often associated with large scale, complex 
development processes, such as pipelines or large facilities that engage multiple 
regulatory processes, often across jurisdictions. For example, the Mackenzie gas 
pipeline spans multiple jurisdictions and engages EA and other environmental 
regulatory requirements at territorial, provincial and federal levels, as well as 
National Energy Board approvals. In order to manage and streamline these 
multiple processes a Cooperation Plan was developed among the regulators. Other 
interested parties in the proceedings, including the project proponents, were 
consulted as part of the development of this process. The Dene Tha’ First Nation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  76.	  102	  Rio	  Tinto,	  supra	  note	  12	  at	  47	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was not consulted and challenged the proceedings on the basis of the Crown’s 
failure to consult. In holding that the Dene Tha’s rights to consultation were 
breached, the Court characterized the Cooperation Plan as “strategic”, in the sense 
that the issues determined through the Cooperation Plan had the potential to 
adversely affect the rights of the Dene Tha’. As a consequence, the Crown’s duty 
extended to the creation of the Cooperation Plan, but the Dene Tha’ were not even 
given notice of the Cooperation Plan, let alone meaningfully consulted about the 
process, resulting in the breach.103  
 
While the court uses the term “strategic”, they remain project oriented. EA 
practice also includes processes for the assessment of higher-level policy, 
planning and programming decisions, often referred to as strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) 104  While these processes are well developed in other 
jurisdictions, they remain largely ad hoc and informal in the Canadian context.105 
Nevertheless, the underlying justification for early consultation suggests that the 
duty to consult will extend to upstream policy decisions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Dene	  Tha'	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Environment),	  2006	  FC	  1354	  [Dene	  Tha’]	  at	  para	  3.	  104	  R.	  Gibson,	  H.	  Benevides,	  M.	  Doelle,	  &	  D.	  Kirchhoff.	  "Strengthening	  Strategic	  Environmental	  Assessment	  in	  Canada:	  An	  Evaluation	  of	  Three	  Basic	  Options"	  (2010)	  20.3	  J.E.LP.	  	  175	  [Gibson,	  et.	  al.]	  105	  There	  is	  a	  federal	  Cabinet	  Directive	  on	  the	  Environmental	  Assessment	  of	  Policy,	  Plan	  and	  Program	  Proposals,	  but	  it	  is	  non-­‐binding	  and	  does	  has	  not	  found	  much	  purchase	  in	  the	  development	  process.	  See	  also	  Gibson,	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  Error!	  Bookmark	  not	  defined..	   Larissa Lucas  2016-1-21 5:25 PMDeleted: 103
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Whether a preliminary proceeding will trigger the duty to consult depends 
on the extent to which those earlier proceedings are likely to prejudice future 
decisions. One of the benefits of integrating the duty to consult with EA is that the 
EA process provides a mechanism for gathering a great deal of project specific 
information on potential impacts. The context specific nature of EA allows 
interested parties to understand how a proposal impacts their interests. However, 
as decisions become more abstracted from the project and more diffuse and 
indirect in their impact, determining whether a policy decision has an adverse 
impact will become more difficult. For example, the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Hupacasath First Nation v. Canada held that the conclusion of a trade agreement 
that may constrain government resources policy was too speculative to give rise to 
the duty to consult.106 It should also be realized that the connection between 
higher-level decisions and subsequent project-level decisions may be more 
apparent in hindsight. 
 
In a case involving the Northern Gateway Pipeline process, the Gitxaala 
First Nation argued that their non-involvement in a marine safety review process 
that formed the background to the larger EA process on the pipeline was a breach 
of their right to be consulted. The court, however, in denying the claim, found that 
the marine safety report did not determine any rights in the broader approvals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Hupacasath	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Canada,	  2015	  FCA	  4	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process and its findings could be challenged within the EA process itself.107 The 
Court also held that given that there was a further public consultation established 
under the EA and or other processes, the Gitxaala Nation’s objections were 
premature.108 The question that the Courts must turn their attention to in these 
instances is the extent to which the prior process creates “clear momentum” that 
forecloses or narrows the subsequent proceedings.109 Whether the prior process in 
binding is not determinative of the matter, but rather the courts appear to look at 
the practical effect of the prior process. The degree to which a subsequent process 
can remedy an earlier failure to consult also appears to be a factor.110 
 
Where the screening assessment discloses adverse impacts on Aboriginal 
interests, the Crown under EA legislation, maintains broad discretion to not 
conduct an EA and to address the duty to consult in a process outside an EA. 
However, such a decision, particularly where the Aboriginal group seeks an EA as 
the preferred mode of consultation, may defeat the purposes of CEAA, which 
include the promotion of “communication and cooperation with aboriginal 
peoples with respect to environmental assessment”.111 Conducting an EA may be 
understood as a form of accommodation itself, since systematic identification and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Gitxaala	  Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Transport,	  Infrastructure	  and	  Communities),	  2012	  FC	  1336	  [Gitxaala]	  at	  para	  51.	  108	  Ibid	  at	  para	  54.	  109	  Ibid	  at	  para	  40,	  citing	  Sambaa	  k’e	  Dene	  Band.	  110	  Ibid	  at	  para	  34.	  111	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  s.4(1)(d).	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assessment of impacts through EA can be understood as an appropriate and 
proportionate means to address those impacts. It remains an open question 
whether the Crown is obligated to exercise its discretion in relation to determining 
whether or not to conduct an EA in a manner that most fully accords with its 
constitutional duty. At a minimum, the screening process should be conducted in a 
manner consistent with the duty to consult, including providing appropriate levels 
of participation and justification. Adherence to the 45-day time limit, as required 
under CEAA, to the detriment of the duty to consult, is likely to be 
unconstitutional.112 
 
One further issue that is likely to arise in the screening stage is how the 
assessment of the strength of claim is integrated into the EA screening process. 
Properly assessing the strength of claim is critical to determining the proper level 
of consultation and the choice of procedures, a central element to screening. 
However, the assessment of the strength of claim often requires complex 
evidence, which may be difficult to gather at the initial stages of the EA and 
which the Crown and First Nations may be reluctant to fully disclose where the 
claim is being contested and is subject to a broader set of negotiations. The BCCA 
suggested that a failure to conduct a strength of claim assessment is not in itself a 
breach of the duty to consult, but may require that the default position be deep 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  dicta	  that	  the	  “Crown’s	  duty	  to	  consult	  cannot	  be	  boxed	  in	  by	  legislation”,	  
KTFN,	  supra	  note	  81	  at	  para	  121.	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consultation.113 In a recent federal EA process on the Roberts Bank Terminal, the 
Aboriginal consultation guidelines state the review panel is to “take assertions of 
Aboriginals rights at face value during the EA process”,114 also suggesting that the 
strength of claim will be assumed, rather than assessed at this stage of 
consultation.  
 
While this approach appears to benefit Aboriginals groups by defaulting to a 
deeper level of consultation, it raises questions about the meaningfulness of the 
consultations that follow since those engaging in consultation on behalf of the 
Crown are making recommendation on the acceptability of impacts and mitigation 
measures, a form of accommodation. Meaningful consultation on these matters 
would seem to require some understanding of the nature of the interests and the 
strength of claim being asserted. The ultimate decision-makers can turn their 
attention to the adequacy of accommodation,115 but conducting the EA without a 
clear strength of claim analysis leaves the Aboriginal group conducting 
consultations with Crown agents that may only be partially aware of what is at 
stake. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  First	  Nation	  v.	  British	  Columbia,	  2012	  BCCA	  472	  [Halalt]	  at	  para	  118;	  see	  also	  NNTC,	  supra	  note	  86	  at	  para	  72.	  114	  Canadian	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Agency,	  Aboriginal	  Consultation	  and	  Environmental	  
Assessment	  Handout,	  Roberts	  Bank	  Terminal	  2	  Project,	  online	  at	  CEAA	  <	  http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/p80054/100180E.pdf	  >.	  115	  Brokenhead,	  supra	  note	  83	  at	  para.	  25.	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ii. Scoping 
 
Once a decision has been made to conduct an EA, the next stage in the EA 
process is the determination of which issues ought to be addressed through the EA 
process, referred to as scoping. The range of issues addressed by EA is potentially 
broad enough to include most of the issues that will arise in the context of the duty 
to consult.116  In the case of CEAA, the definition of “environmental effects” 
explicitly includes broad range of effects on Aboriginal peoples, including 
impacts on “health and socio-economic conditions, physical and cultural heritage, 
the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes, or any structure, 
site or thing that is of historical [or] archeological… significance”.117 The effects 
must arise from changes to the environment that relate to the project. The 
restriction to “current” use of lands and resources for traditional purposes may be 
overly restrictive to fully account for the interests that are protected by the duty to 
consult. The scope of effects considered here should be interpreted to be 
consistent with scope of the constitutional rights being asserted, an approach that 
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  Again	  there	  is	  some	  variation	  across	  federal,	  provincial	  and	  territorial	  EA	  systems	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  assessments.	  Generally	  the	  scope	  focuses	  on	  bio-­‐physical	  impacts,	  but	  includes	  health,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  cultural	  impacts	  that	  arise	  from	  environmental	  change,	  see	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.5(2)(b).	  117	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  s.5(c),	  numbering	  omitted,	  emphasis	  added.	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is consistent with the broader purposes of the Act.118 What are clearly excluded 
from the process are broader questions of unresolved land claims.119 
 
An area of growing importance in relation to the scope of assessment is the 
degree to which cumulative effects are assessed. Assessing cumulative 
environmental effects requires consideration of the impact of the activity under 
consideration, while taking into account the combined effect from other activities 
that have been or will be carried out.120 The significance of cumulative effects in 
the context of the duty to consult was acknowledged by the SCC in the Beckman 
case, where Binnie noted that “the severity of the impact of land grants, whether 
taken individually or cumulatively, properly constituted an important element of 
consultation”.121 The Federal Court in the Brokenhead Ojibway case similarly 
commented that: “While the environmental footprint of any one project might 
appear quite modest, the eventual cumulative impact of development on the rights 
and traditional interests of Aboriginal peoples can be quite profound”.122 This 
sentiment is repeated by the BC Supreme Court in Taseko Mines Limited v. 
Phillips, an injunction case, where in holding the balance of convenience favoured 
the Aboriginal group, the Court notes:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Ibid	  at	  s.4.	  119	  Brokenhead,	  supra	  note	  83	  at	  para	  27.	  120	  Brokenhead,	  supra	  note	  83	  at	  s.19(1)(a).	  121	  Beckman,	  supra	  note	  4	  at	  para	  21.	  122	  Brokenhead,	  supra	  note	  83	  at	  para	  28.	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Each new incursion serves only to narrow further the habitat left to 
them in which to exercise their traditional rights.  Consequently, 
each new incursion becomes more significant than the last.  Each 
newly cleared trail remains a scar, for although reclamation is 
required, restoration is impossible.  The damage is irreparable.  It 
follows that if only a portion of the proposed new clearings and trails 
prove to be unnecessary, the preservation of that portion is vital.123 
 
Cumulative effects could influence the determination of the strength of 
claim insofar as the Haida test requires courts to consider the impact of the 
development on the exercise of the asserted rights. A project, when considered in 
isolation, may have only a minor impact (such as early stage mineral exploration), 
giving rise to a duty at the low end of the duty to consult spectrum. However, 
when considered in combination with other activities, the impact may be more 
profound, leading to a more extensive duty to consult and accommodate. 
Addressing cumulative effects poses a significant challenge to the efficient 
management of EA in Aboriginal contexts and may increasingly push regulators 
towards planning and licensing models that can account for multiple projects.124 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Taseko	  Mines	  Limited	  v.	  Phillips,	  2011	  BCSC	  1675	  [Taseko]	  at	  para	  65;	  see	  also	  Lameman	  v.	  Alberta,	  2012	  ABCA	  159;	  Lameman	  v.	  Alberta	  ABQB	  195.	  124	  See,	  for	  example,	  Fort	  McKay	  First	  Nation	  v	  Alberta	  (Minister	  of	  Environment	  and	  Sustainable	  
Resource	  Development),	  2014	  ABQB	  393	  [Fort	  McKay];	  and	  Dene	  Tha’	  First	  Nation	  v.	  British	  Columbia	  
(Minister	  of	  Energy	  and	  Mines),	  2013	  BCSC	  977	  [Dene	  Tha’	  2013];	  see	  also	  E.	  R.	  Tzimas	  “To	  What	  End	  the	  Dialogue?”	  (2011)	  54:2	  S.C.L.R.	  493	  at	  517.	  
	   Process	  and	  Reconciliation	  
47	  	  
Strategic EA may provide some basis to assess cumulative effects where the 
upstream policy or plan considers impacts on a regional scale. But to date the 
available tools to perform these kinds of assessments are poorly developed, and 
continue to lead to disputes respecting the assessment of cumulative impacts over 
time.125 
 
There has been some controversy surrounding whether consideration of 
impacts from existing and approved projects contravenes the holding in Rio Tinto 
that the duty to consult does not extent to consultation on the impacts of past 
projects.126 This issue was raised squarely in West Moberly First Nation v. B.C. In 
this case, the central issue was the impacts of a coalmine exploration and 
sampling project on caribou herds that had already been significantly depleted. 
The decision to approve, which did not fully consider the cumulative impacts of 
the past activities or the future development of the mine was stayed pending 
further consultation. In upholding the judges decision, the BCCA, distinguished 
Rio Tinto, noting that the WMFN was not seeking consultation on past decisions, 
but rather was seeking consultation of the impacts from the proposal in light of the 
severely degraded ecological conditions that prevailed: 
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  See,	  for	  example,	  Yahey	  v.	  British	  Columbia,	  2015	  BCSC	  1302.	  126	  Rio	  Tinto,	  supra	  note	  12	  at	  para	  45	  “The	  claimant	  must	  show	  a	  causal	  relationship….”.	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I do not understand Rio Tinto to be authority for saying that when the 
“current decision under consideration” will have an adverse impact on a 
First Nations right, as in this case, that what has gone before is irrelevant. 
Here, the exploration and sampling projects will have an adverse impact 
on the petitioners’ treaty right, and the historical context is essential to a 
proper understanding of the seriousness of the potential impacts on the 
petitioners’ treaty right to hunt.127 
 
Additionally, the Court went to hold that the chambers judge did not err in 
considering future impacts, “beyond the immediate consequences of the 
exploration permits”, and further held that “to the extent that MEMPR [the 
approving regulator] failed to consider the impact of a full mining operation in the 
area of concern, it failed to provide meaningful consultation”.128 This holding is 
best understood in light of the prevailing practice in relation to scoping 
cumulative effects, which maintains that only “likely” cumulative effects need be 
considered.129 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  West	  Moberly	  First	  Nations	  v.	  British	  Columbia	  (Chief	  Inspector	  of	  Mines),	  2011	  BCCA	  247	  [WMFN]	  at	  para	  117;	  see	  also	  Upper	  Nicola	  Indian	  Band	  v.	  British	  Columbia	  (Environment),	  2011	  BCSC	  388.	  128	  WMFN,	  supra	  note	  127	  at	  para	  125;	  see	  also	  Adam	  v.	  Canada	  (Environment),	  2014	  FC	  1185	  at	  para	  85;	  White	  River	  First	  Nation	  v.	  Yukon	  Government,	  2013	  YKSC	  66	  at	  para	  136	  [WRFN];	  Fort	  MacKay,	  
supra	  note	  124	  at	  para	  15.	  129	  Bow	  Valley	  Naturalists	  Society	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Canadian	  Heritage),	  1999	  FC	  8735	  at	  para	  41;	  see	  also	  CEEA,	  Operational	  Policy	  Statement:	  Assessing	  Cumulative	  Environmental	  Effects	  under	  the	  CEAA,	  2012	  (March	  2015)	  <	  https://www.ceaa-­‐acee.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=1DA9E048-­‐1>	  (noting	  “A cumulative environmental effects assessment of a designated project must include future 
physical activities that are certain and should generally include physical activities that are reasonably 
foreseeable.”).	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A second issue that has yet to receive significance judicial consideration is 
the requirement within EA processes to consider alternatives to the proposal and 
the environmental effects of those alternatives. 130  Alternatives have been 
described in the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (which contains the 
federal EA requirements) regulations as “the heart of the environmental impact 
statement… providing a clear choice of options by the decision-maker and the 
public”.131 Alternatives analysis plays a particularly important role in light of the 
absence of clear quantitative standards to assess the acceptability of impacts, as 
alternatives provide an evaluative substitute in the sense that the impacts from the 
proposed activity can be measured against the impacts of a proposed alternative. 
In relation to the duty to consult, alternatives provide a basis to assess forms of 
accommodation. If a First Nation identifies a reasonable alternative that is less 
adversely impactful on Aboriginal rights and interests, then there is, at a 
minimum, a burden of justification on the Crown to demonstrate why that 
alternative was not preferred. 
 
The issue of alternatives arose in the West Moberly case, where the WMFN 
put forward what was effectively a “no action” alternative, asking that the 
exploration permits be refused. This alternative was not seriously considered and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.	  19(1)(g).	  131	  Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations, 40 CFR § 1502.14.	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no indication was given as to why this position was impractical or unreasonable. 
In upholding that this failure was a reviewable error, the BCCA noted that the lack 
of engagement of the WMFN’s preferred position effectively meant that the 
consultation was limited to mitigation of effects and thus did not recognize the 
full range of possible outcomes. This, in the Courts view, amounted “to nothing 
more than an opportunity for the First Nations “to blow off steam”. 132 The Crown 
was not required to accept the WMFN’s alternative, which would amount to a 
veto, but was required to “provide a satisfactory, reasoned explanation as to why 
their position was not accepted”.133 Alternatives analysis is not an established 
approach to the duty to consult, nevertheless it furthers the underlying purpose of 
meaningful consultation. In particular, the notion of a preferred alternative aligns 
with the idea articulated in the Sparrow test that Aboriginal groups ought to be 
able to exercise their rights with minimal impairment and in their preferred 
manner.134  
 
As with other scoping decisions the challenge will be determining the 
potential range of reasonable alternatives. In some cases, such as CEAA, the range 
of alternatives to be considered may be qualified by legislative. CEAA limits the 
requirement to consider alternatives to “alternatives means of carrying out the 
designated project that are “technically and economically feasible”. This is a fairly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  WMFN,	  supra	  note	  127	  at	  para	  149.	  133	  Ibid	  at	  para	  148.	  134	  Sparrow,	  supra	  note	  15.	  	   Larissa Lucas  2016-1-21 5:25 PMDeleted: 129
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narrow range of alternatives, which excludes consideration of “no action” 
alternatives or alternatives to the project itself, both of which where included in 
the pre-2012 version of CEAA.135 However, the range of preferred alternatives 
sought by Aboriginal groups may be much broader and a statutory requirement 
that limits alternatives to those that are economically feasible may subordinate 
Aboriginal rights to economic considerations without clear justification on the 
facts.136 In these circumstances, an overly restrictive approach to consideration of 
alternatives in EA is out of step with the duty to consult. 
 
iii. Participation 
 
There are several important differences in relation to the participation 
requirements under EA and the duty to consult. First, Aboriginals are entitled to 
be consulted as First Nations, and not simply as members of the general public. 
Thus, in the Mikisew Creee case, it was held that a public forum was not a 
substitute for formal consultation.137 Even at the lower end of the spectrum (as 
was the case in Mikisew Cree), “engagement ought to have included the 
provisions of information about the project addressing what the Crown knew to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  See	  CEAA	  1992,	  supra	  note	  98,	  s.16	  (included	  as	  permissive	  factors	  to	  consider	  “alternatives	  to”	  the	  project	  and	  to	  consider	  the	  “need”	  for	  the	  project,	  effectively	  raising	  the	  “no	  action”	  alternative);	  see	  also	  Meinhard	  Doelle,	  “CEAA	  2012:	  The	  End	  of	  Federal	  EA	  As	  We	  Know	  It?	  (2013)	  24	  J.E.L.P.	  1	  at	  13.	  136	  Note,	  nothing	  prevents	  the	  Crown	  from	  considering	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  factors	  if	  it	  chooses,	  see	  
CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.19(1)(j).	  137	  Mikisew,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  64.	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Mikisew interests and what the Crown anticipated might be the potential adverse 
impact on those interests”.138 Public notice and comment processes in relation to 
EA activities, including consultation on the structure of the process and scoping, 
without something more, are not likely to be sufficient.139 
 
Second, the courts have generally held that the right to consultation falls to 
the Aboriginal group itself, and not individual members within the group.140 Thus, 
in a case involving a request for an injunction enjoining a blockade, the 
blockading individuals maintained that they had not been consulted. The court, in 
granting the injunction, noted such rights were held by the First Nation itself, and 
on the facts, the First Nations affected had been adequately consulted. 141 
Nevertheless, individuals who belong to First Nations will have rights as members 
of the public under the EA process that are not detracted from by virtue of their 
membership in a First Nation, but those rights will be of the same nature as those 
held by non-Aboriginals. 
 
The more difficult question relates to who must carry out the consultations 
on behalf of the Crown during the EA process. As noted, the Court in Haida 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Ibid.	  139	  Dene	  Tha’,	  supra	  note	  103	  at	  para	  104.	  140	  Newman,	  supra	  note	  25	  at	  65,	  (citing	  R.	  v.	  Lefthand,	  2007	  ABCA	  206,	  but	  noting	  issue	  not	  fully	  closed	  as	  arguments	  that	  some	  Aboriginal	  rights	  might	  be	  individually	  held	  made	  in	  Behn	  v.	  Moulton	  
Contracting,	  2013	  SCC	  26).	  141	  Red	  Chris	  Development	  v.	  Quock	  et	  al.,	  2006	  BCSC	  1472.	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Nation draws a distinction between the procedural and non-procedural aspects of 
the duty to consult, indicating the former may be delegated. The practical problem 
that needs to addressed is that decision-making processes for large-scale projects 
are often very complicated, involving multiple agencies, review panels and federal 
and provincial governments. The trend in EA procedure has been to seek to 
reduce overlap through joint panels and substituted decision-making. Mapping the 
duty to consult on to these procedures is likely to present legal uncertainty.  For 
example, the issue of substitution, whereby one level of government agrees to 
substitute its EA process for the process of another level, has been challenged in 
the Northern Gateway pipeline process on the basis that the provincial 
government cannot delegate its duty to consult to federal agencies.142  
 
One result of the use of panels in EA processes is the parceling out of the 
duty to consult among different actors with different mandates. The emerging 
federal practice is to use the panel reviews as the primary mechanism for 
informing Aboriginal groups of the project and receiving information from those 
groups on their interests and how those interests might be affected. The panel may 
make recommendations, but has a restricted mandate that excludes determinations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  See	  for	  example,	  the	  proceedings	  in	  Gitxaala	  Nation	  v.	  Canada,	  (FC	  docket	  Nos.	  A-­‐56-­‐14),	  (factums	  in	  proceedings	  available	  online	  at	  West	  Coast	  Environmental	  Law:	  http://wcel.org/category/publications/aboriginal-­‐law.	  See	  also,	  G.	  Hoekstra,	  “Legal	  challenges	  mount	  involving	  Northern	  Gateway	  pipeline”	  The	  Vancouver	  Sun	  (13	  January	  2015),	  online	  <http://www.edmontonjournal.com/technology/Legal+challenges+mount+involving+Northern+Gateway+pipeline/10726698/story.html#__federated=1>.	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on questions of strength of claim and on the adequacy of the consultation process 
itself. Further consultation over the panel’s recommendations, particularly around 
mitigation measures is undertaken with the Crown Consultation Coordinator, who 
in turns reports on the adequacy of consultation to Cabinet.143 On that basis 
Cabinet can make an independent determination on the adequacy of the 
consultation and accommodation.  
 
The extent to which EA processes merely facilitate Aboriginal 
understanding of the project, but leave consultation to a parallel process is likely 
to remain a source of tension. As noted, where consultation arises outside of the 
EA process, it must nonetheless offer the possibility of modification of the project 
to address impacts on Aboriginal rights in order to be meaningful. However, 
where the modifications give rise to substantially different environmental 
consequences, further environmental assessment and consultation with non-
Aboriginal stakeholders may be warranted. 
 
The courts have not questioned the overall ability of these staged processes 
to implement the duty to consult.144 Nonetheless, the adequacy of consultation in 
these types of EA proceedings may turn on whether the resulting consultation 
meets the qualitative requirement for “meaningful” consultation. The White River 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Northern	  Gateway,	  supra	  note	  94.	  144	  Innu,	  supra	  note	  82	  at	  para	  113.	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First Nation v. Yukon case is illustrative. Here an EA evaluation report of a mine 
was carried out and recommended against the granting of approvals on the basis 
of the mine’s potential impact on a caribou herd that had significance for the 
exercise of the WRFN’s Aboriginal rights. The Report was provided to the 
Director of Mineral Resources, who rejected the Report’s finding and granted the 
approval. Consultation was carried out by the Director with the WRFN, but did 
not involve a clear disclosure of the Director’s basis for rejecting the report, which 
was supported by the WRFN. The court held that the duty to consult was not met 
in these circumstances because the consultation did not amount to an “exchange 
of views”145 In particular, because the WRFN was not provided with any basis for 
the Director’s rejection of the report they had no opportunity to present their 
views or challenge the decision: “Fairness and the honour of the Crown require 
that the First Nation be given an opportunity and time to put forward their view 
when the Decision Body, as here, is contemplating a decision completely at odds 
with the one that was rendered after an in-depth consultation process.”146 
 
One final point in relation to consultation under the EA process picks up on 
a point made by Sossin that in order for consultation to be meaningful, the Crown 
may be required to take positive steps to facilitate Aboriginal participation.147 
Given the technical nature of EA processes and the often highly specialized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  WRFN,	  supra	  note	  128	  at	  para	  112.	  146	  Ibid	  at	  para	  123.	  147	  Sossin,	  supra	  note	  25	  at	  107.	   Larissa Lucas  2016-1-21 5:25 PMDeleted: 130
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information and expertise requirements EA processes involve, adequate funding is 
likely to be a potential source of contention. The potential for financial assistance 
is acknowledged in relation to EA in federal and provincial consultation 
guidelines, 148  and in cases where the courts have upheld EA processes as 
satisfying the duty to consult, such as Taku River, the Crown has provided 
financial assistance.149 Aboriginal groups who seek to challenge the EA on the 
basis of that funding was necessary to facilitate meaningful consultation will need 
to clearly demonstrate the need for the funding, and cannot simply insist upon 
their preferred method (and its associated costs) of participation.150 
 
iv. The Decision 
 
Since both the duty to consult and EA are underlain by good faith, the 
provision of reasons are of central importance, as it is only through the provision 
of reasons by which the Aboriginal group, in the case of the duty to consult, and 
the public, in the case of EA, can assess whether the concerns raised were given 
serious consideration. The challenge for reviewing courts is to separate good faith 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Federal	  Guidelines,	  supra	  note	  89	  at	  30;	  BC	  Guide,	  supra	  note	  91	  at	  3.	  149	  Taku	  River,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  37;	  see	  also	  KTFN,	  supra	  note	  21	  at	  para	  112;	  Katlodeeche	  First	  
Nation	  v.	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  2013	  FC	  458	  at	  para	  167;	  see	  also	  Halalt,	  supra	  note	  113.	  150	  Innu,	  supra	  note	  82	  at	  para	  129.	   Larissa Lucas  2016-1-21 5:25 PMDeleted: 115
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consultations from processes that are merely intended to allow Aboriginal groups 
to “blow off steam”.151 
 
The obligation to provide reasons arises at the higher end of the consultation 
spectrum,152 and will be required not only in relation to the final decision, but also 
in relation to interim decisions, respecting screening and scoping, for example, 
that impact asserted Aboriginal rights.153 The relationship between a reasoned 
justification and the duty was set out forcefully in the West Moberly decision, 
where the court found that the failure to provide reasons for the rejection of the 
WMFN’s preferred alternative contravened the duty to consult: 
 
To be considered reasonable, I think the consultation process, and hence 
the “Rationale”, would have to provide an explanation to the petitioners 
that, not only had their position been fully considered, but that there 
were persuasive reasons why the course of action the petitioners 
proposed was either not necessary, was impractical, or was otherwise 
unreasonable. Without a reasoned basis for rejecting the petitioners’ 
position, there cannot be said to have been a meaningful consultation.154 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Mikisew,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  54.	  152	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  44	  153	  Ibid.	  154	  WMFN,	  supra	  note	  127	  at	  144.	   Larissa Lucas  2016-1-21 5:25 PMDeleted: 129
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The practice under EA in relation to the provision of reasons is uneven. In 
some cases, the courts have held that assessment reports cannot simply come to 
bald conclusions respecting the significance of impacts, but rather must provide 
some reasoned basis for the conclusions reached.155 However, high-level decisions 
respecting projects often take a more declaratory form.156 In Adam v. Canada, the 
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation challenged a decision taken under s.52 of 
CEAA that determined that the impacts from the Jackpine oil sands expansion 
project while significant, were justified in the circumstances. The cabinet decision 
and accompanying Decision Statement provided no justification for the 
decision.157 The Federal Court, in dismissing the appeal, rather opaquely stated 
that the Crown was not required to justify the Cabinet’s decision, so long as it 
provided a justification of its rejection of ACFN’s position within the broader 
process.158 The thrust of the Court’s decision in Adam is that so long as the Crown 
meets its procedural requirements, in this case the ACFN participated in a lengthy 
and extensive panel process and was further invited to make representations on 
whether the report captured its concerns, and shows that it gave the Aboriginal 
group’s concerns serious consideration, the duty will be satisfied.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Pembina	  Institute	  for	  Appropriate	  Development	  v.	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  2008	  FC	  302	  [Pembina]	  at	  para	  73:	  (“I recognize that placing an administrative burden on the Panel to provide an 
in-depth explanation of the scientific data for all of its conclusions and recommendations would be 
disproportionately high. However, given that the Report is to serve as an objective basis for a final 
decision, the Panel must, in my opinion, explain in a general way why the potential environmental effects, 
either with or without the implementation of mitigation measures, will be insignificant”).	  156	  Again	  using	  CEAA	  2012,	  as	  an	  example,	  the	  revised	  EA	  rules	  removed	  a	  required	  found	  in	  s.53(2)c)	  of	  CEAA,	  1992	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  not	  following	  a	  review	  panel’s	  recommendation.	  157	  Adam	  v.	  Canada	  (Environment),	  2014	  FC	  1185.	  158Ibid	  at	  para.	  81.	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Sossin argues that the underlying substantive nature of accommodation 
imposes a greater constraint on the Crown, requiring the Crown “to show that 
governments’ substantive position has been modified as a result” of consultation. 
If Sossin is right, then a critical element of any consultation will be assessing 
mitigation measures and the acceptability of impacts in light of the strength of 
claim. As the strength of claim approaches the very high end, one would expect 
that the justification would also approach that which is required to justify the 
infringement of an established right; namely a substantial and compelling 
objective.  
 
The prevailing approach identifies mitigation measures that in the Crown’s 
view minimize the adverse effects to Aboriginal interests. The extent to which the 
proposed activity may still adversely impact Aboriginal interests and the basis 
upon which those potential impacts are justified is not readily disclosed.159 As 
noted, in many instances, the actual assessment is undertaken without a coinciding 
strength of claim analysis and the acceptable mitigation measures are determined, 
in the first instance, in the absence of knowledge of the strength of claim. 
 
v. Standard of Review and Remedies for Breach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Ibid.	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The standard of review for matters involving legal interpretations of EA 
legislations is correctness, while the standard for application of evidence and 
exercise of discretion (questions of mixed fact and law) within EA processes is 
reasonableness.160 Thus, decisions respecting screening and scoping of EAs will 
be reviewed on the basis of reasonableness. In relation to the duty to consult, the 
standard of review was addressed in Haida Nation, with the accepted approach 
being to review questions regarding the existence and content of the duty on a 
correctness standard and questions respecting the adequacy of consultation and 
accommodation on a reasonableness standard.161 Subsequent decisions have noted 
that the determination of the existence of a duty, which involves assessments of 
the strength of claim and the serious of the impacts, may involve findings of fact, 
in which case some deference will be owed to the decision-maker.162  
 
Separating out what may constitute the “scope and extent” of the duty from 
how that duty is discharged in the context of EA will not always be 
straightforward. For example, a screening decision, which involves a 
determination of whether there is a likelihood of significant environmental impact, 
will be treated with deference under EA processes, but insofar as determining the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Ontario	  Power	  Generation	  Inc.	  v.	  Greenpeace	  Canada,	  2015	  FCA	  186,	  paras.	  120-­‐121.	  Seealso	  
Pembina	  Institute	  for	  Appropriate	  Development	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	  of	  Fisheries	  and	  Oceans),	  2005	  FC	  1123.	  161	  Haida,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  60-­‐63;	  Brokenhead,	  supra	  note	  83	  at	  para	  17.	  162	  Wii’litswx,	  supra	  note	  24;	  Dene	  Tha’	  2013,	  supra	  note	  124	  at	  para	  99.	  	   Larissa Lucas  2016-1-21 5:25 PMDeleted: 126
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significance of impacts on Aboriginal interests goes to the extent of the duty to 
consult, it may be treated on a correctness standard, as appears to be the approach 
in the White River case.163 Much will turn on the extent to which the court views 
the determination driven by factual considerations, in which case greater 
deference will likely be shown. There is evidence that the approach in relation to 
the implementation of the duty through EA will be looked at functionally, with the 
court assessing whether the process that was followed allowed for “meaningful 
consultation”. In West Moberly, the BCCA effectively equated a consultation 
process that was not meaningful with unreasonableness. 164  What the courts 
recognize here is that the consultation process itself, which often involves 
consultation on the form of the EA, determines the correctness of the scope.165  
 
In assessing the actual outcomes of EA processes, the court will again look 
to the reasonableness of the decision. In doing so, however, the Courts need to be 
mindful of the central importance of justification to the consultation process. In 
other words, there is a need to assess the quality of the reasons, not so much to 
ensure that the result itself is reasonable, but to ensure that the process that gave 
rise to the result was meaningful and carried out in good faith. The principal form 
of accommodation that is provided through EA processes is the identification of 
mitigation measures that are intended to eliminate or reduce adverse impacts to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163WRFN,	  supra	  note	  128	  at	  para	  95.	  164	  WMFN,	  supra	  note	  127	  at	  para	  154;	  see	  also	  WRFN,	  supra	  note	  128	  at	  para	  115	  165	  Dene	  Tha’	  2013,	  supra	  note	  124	  at	  para	  105.	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asserted Aboriginal rights. In this context, meaningful consultation suggests that 
the mitigation measures, at a minimum, ought to be responsive to the preferred 
alternatives put forward by Aboriginal groups.  
 
Where there has been a breach of the procedural requirements of EA, the 
courts exercise broad discretion in determining the remedy. In the Miningwatch 
case, where Responsible Authority was found to have misapplied the scoping 
rules by scoping a mining project in an overly narrow fashion, the SCC restricted 
its remedy to declaratory relief, overturning a decision of the federal court to 
require further consultation and assessment in accordance with proper scoping 
requirements.166 The basis of the decision is complicated, but included the fact 
that the complaint was procedural in nature and not in relation to the substance of 
the decision.167 The Miningwatch decision has been relied upon in at least one 
duty to consult case involving deficient EA processes to provide support for 
restricting relief to a declaration.168  
 
Both cases may be restricted to their unique facts, but it is important to 
recognize in the context of remedies that procedural deficiencies take on particular 
importance in the context of the duty to consult precisely because the substantive 
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  MiningWatch	  Canada	  v.	  Canada	  (Fisheries	  and	  Oceans),	  2010	  SCC	  2	  [Miningwatch].	  167	  Ibid	  at	  para	  52.	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  NNTC,	  supra	  note	  86	  at	  para	  106.	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requirements are so indeterminate. The process here is to a large degree the ends 
sought. Unlike purely administrative proceedings where the court’s discretion to 
grant a remedy may consider the broader balance of convenience to the parties, (in 
Miningwatch, the SCC felt it was unfair to burden the mining company with the 
consequences of the government’s mishandling of the EA), the constitutional 
dimensions of the duty to consult militate in favour of a robust approach to 
remedies.169 
 
3. Process and Reconciliation: Matching Theory and Practice 
 
Early in the life of NEPA, the environmental law scholar Joseph Sax 
famously expressed his skepticism about the underlying premise of EA: 
 
I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring 
articulation, detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity 
or propriety of administrative decisions. I think the emphasis on the 
redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine parts myth and one 
part coconut oil.170 
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  WRFN,	  supra	  note	  128	  at	  para	  37	  (“While	  Tarsis	  is	  a	  responsible	  exploration	  company	  and	  its	  contribution	  is	  important,	  the	  participation	  and	  involvement	  of	  First	  Nations	  without	  a	  Final	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  both	  a	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  and	  a	  constitutional	  dimension	  that	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  170	  Joseph	  Sax,	  “The	  (Unhappy)	  Truth	  about	  NEPA”	  (1973)	  26	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  L.R.	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Since that time, EA scholars have offered a number of different approaches to 
explain how adherence to procedural requirements brings about desired 
environmental outcomes.171 While these approaches offer an explanatory model 
for how EA effects outcomes, the approaches also tend to diverge in the role they 
ascribe to EA, and structural features of EA upon which they lay emphasis. One 
set of approaches, identified by Holder as informational theories, stresses the 
rationality of EA planning processes, and focuses on the need to develop better 
technical tools and metrics for assessment, but tends to downplay value 
disputes.172 Environmentally sound outcomes arise under this model because 
decision-makers are assumed to be able to accurately assess the costs of 
potentially harmful activities and avoid or mitigate unacceptable environmental 
outcomes in the public interest.173 Culture or transformatve theories by contrast 
recognize the normative influence that environmental information has on political 
processes and tend to understand that interactions involving environmental values 
can have transformative effects on political interests and institutional structures.174 
The emphasis under transformational approaches is on the deliberative quality of 
the interactions and the justificatory nature of the decisions. 
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  Bartlett	  and	  Kurian,	  supra	  note	  39;	  James	  Boggs,	  “Procedural	  v.	  Substantive	  in	  NEPA	  Law:	  Cutting	  the	  Gordian	  Knot”	  (1993)	  15	  Envt’l	  Professional	  25;	  Taylor,	  supra	  note	  39;	  Craik,	  supra	  note	  39.	  172	  Holder,	  supra	  note	  34	  at	  23.	  173	  C. Jones et al, Strategic Environmental Assessment and Land Use Planning: An International 
Evaluation, (Bath: Earthscan, 2013) 35-36.	  174	  Holder,	  supra	  note	  34	  at	  27;	  Boggs,	  supra	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  171;	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When EA is considered in light of its role as a way to implement the duty to 
consult, informational approaches offer a limited framework to explain the 
broader aspirations of reconciliation that underlie the duty. First, informational 
approaches are premised on a single, monolithic conception of public interest. The 
problems to which EA addresses itself are technical and solvable with recourse to 
better technical information. The duty to consult, on the other hand, accepts a 
much more pluralistic and political understanding of the decision-making 
processes engaged. At the heart of the duty to accommodate is the notion of 
compromise and negotiation. Accommodation is not technical issue that can be 
resolved with improved information. Second, informational approaches tend to 
view participation in instrumental terms, in the sense that the object of 
participation is to provide experts with additional information, whereas the duty to 
consult views participation in much more dialogical terms. The duty to consult 
requires an “exchange of views” and demands responses to alternatives proposed. 
Finally, the underlying theory of legitimacy under informational approaches is 
rooted in the expertise of the agency decision-makers, whereas the legitimacy of 
decisions arrived at through the duty to consult is premised on the deliberative 
characteristics of participatory decision-making. In other words, decisions are 
accepted under informational theories because the process is able to identify 
optimal solutions. Justification appeals to technical criteria, but is indifferent to 
the normative dimensions of the decision. There is an ahistorical element to 
informational approaches that fails to acknowledge the context of government 
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mistrust that reconciliation seeks to ameliorate: good faith is assumed under 
informational theories, whereas it is required to be demonstrated under the duty to 
consult. 
 
It might seem that informational approaches present something of straw 
man, insofar as Canadian EA processes appear to embrace a more participatory 
model of EA. While that may be true, the technical focus that informational 
approaches suggest still has a powerful influence over how EAs are conducted 
and how courts understand them.175 Recall, that in the Oldman River case, the 
SCC described EA as providing an “an objective basis for granting or denying 
approval of a proposed development”, suggesting a technical, as opposed to 
political, orientation. Even where the courts acknowledge that EA involves “a 
large measure of opinion and judgement”, the underlying disputes are described in 
technical not political terms.176 The fundamental point I seek to make here is that 
while EA processes and the courts that consider them acknowledge the important 
role of participation, it is understood in instrumental terms – it is a means to an 
end. It is in that regard that the Court in Miningwatch felt partially justified in 
offering no substantive remedy in the face of a procedural breach since in the 
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  Bartlett	  and	  Kurian,	  supra	  note	  39	  at	  417-­‐418.	  176	  Alberta	  Wilderness	  Assn.	  v.	  Express	  Pipelines	  Ltd.	  [1996]	  F.C.J.	  No.	  1016	  at	  para	  10	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Court’s view there was no actual harm to the applicant (a public interest 
litigant).177 
 
One of the outstanding puzzles in relation to the duty to accommodate is the 
extent to which the Crown has to affirmatively address Aboriginal concerns. The 
framing of the duty as a balancing test suggests a measure of ambivalence to 
outcomes, in the sense that the test provides little guidance to how that balance is 
to be achieved, leaving the determination as a matter of Crown discretion. Potes 
describes two competing approaches to the duty to accommodate; a “procedural” 
approach, which views accommodation being satisfied by adherence to the 
procedural requirements of the duty to consult, and a “purposive” approach that 
requires adherence to substantive standards.178 The difficulty, as outlined in Part 
1, is that drawing a sharp distinction between process and substance in this 
context fails to capture the dynamic relationship between the two, and suggests 
that that they can be independently assessed. Potes is sensitive to this dynamic, 
but does not offer a theory of how this interaction may function. 
 
Transformational theories better capture the essence of reconciliation, and 
may even provide a way of understanding reconciliation in the institutionalized 
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  Miningwatch,	  supra	  note	  166	  at	  para	  52.	  178	  Veronica	  Potes,	  “The	  Duty	  to	  Accommodate	  Aboriginal	  peoples’	  Rights”	  (2006)	  17	  J.E.L.P.	  27	  at	  33-­‐38	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context of project decision-making. Transformational approaches do not regard 
the interests and values of the participants in EA processes as fixed, but rather 
understand that participation in the process itself may impact interests. Interest 
reformulation is endogenous to the EA process, allowing for the possibility of 
participants learning through the process and reconsidering their interests in light 
of new information and shared understandings.179 
 
Transformational theories of EA locate the legitimacy of the outcomes 
within the deliberative qualities of the interactions, as opposed to the expertise of 
the decision-makers. Looking at the quality of interactions, which is what I would 
argue is at the centre of the requirement of good faith in the duty to consult, 
requires that the parties treat each other’s position with a minimum level of 
respect, which in turn requires that decision-makers be open to persuasion based 
on the arguments provided.180 The deliberative dimensions of the duty to consult 
are captured in Mikisew Cree, where Binnie links the quality of consultation with 
the possibility of accommodation, noting that “consultation that excludes from the 
outset any form of accommodation would be meaningless”.181  
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  Sinclair	  and	  Diduck,	  supra	  note	  59;	  see	  also	  Craik,	  supra	  note	  39.	  180	  Simone	  Chambers,	  “Deliberative	  Democratic	  Theory”	  (2003)	  6	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science	  307	  at	  309.	  181	  Mikisew,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  para	  54.	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Understood through a transformational lens, the institutional deficiencies to 
which EA legislation was responding were that government decision-making had 
“not been receptive to an adequate range of facts, had not been able to break away 
from well-known formulas, and had been insufficiently critical and excessively 
rigid”.182 The duty to consult responds to these same deficiencies. Justification 
takes on a heighten importance because it not simply a description of the basis of 
the outcome as decided by the Crown, but is required to be reciprocal in the sense 
that the reasons given must respond to the concerns raised and must be appeal to 
shared norms. In the context of the duty to consult, reciprocal justification 
requires that decision-makers carefully consider Aboriginal perspectives and seek 
out justifications that incorporate Aboriginal values. The promise of 
transformational approaches is that reciprocal justification offers an opportunity 
for those affected by government decisions to participate in the elaboration of the 
norms of evaluation. For example, the determination of what constitutes a 
“significant” impact to the environment and to Aboriginal rights ought to be 
arrived at jointly with due regard for both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
perspectives. Reconciliation can be understood as co-authorship of the norms that 
shape the conditions of Aboriginal lives. The self-governing element of co-
authorship captures the need to “reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty 
with assumed Crown sovereignty” 183  and the balancing of interests. 
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  Bartlett,	  	  supra	  note	  59	  at	  110.	  183	  Haida,	  supra	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  at	  para	  20.	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Reconciliation fully realized suggests the possibility of the development of shared 
interests, as opposed to trading off Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests, and it 
is in this sense that the process can contribute to s.35’s jurisgenerative potential.184 
 
Returning to the form of EA commitments that will be required to 
implement the duty to consult, we can identify certain elements of the EA process 
that are more consistent with a transformational function. First, the requirement 
for alternatives should be applied with full rigour. The requirement to assess 
alternatives will be relevant at both the scoping and decision stages of EA. At the 
scoping stage, the determination of which issues are to be assessed and the depth 
of assessment will need to account for preferred Aboriginal alternatives. At the 
decision stage, where alternatives have been considered, the reasons given will 
need to respond to the preferred Aboriginal alternatives and provide, where 
appropriate, a justification for the rejection of those alternatives. 
 
In the absence of standards that address themselves to acceptable levels of 
interference with Aboriginal interests, requiring the careful examination of 
preferred Aboriginal alternatives requires the Crown to address itself to the 
question of whether the same public objective can be achieved in a manner that is 	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  See	  Robert	  Cover,	  “Nomos	  and	  Narrative”	  (1983)	  97	  Harvard	  L.	  Rev.	  4	  (introducing	  the	  concept	  of	  jurisgenerativity);	  For	  application	  of	  concept	  in	  indigenous	  context,	  see	  Kristen	  Carpenter	  &	  Angela	  Riley,	  “Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  the	  Jurisgenerative	  Moment	  in	  Human	  Rights”,	  (2014)	  102:1	  Cal.	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less likely to infringe Aboriginal interests. This would require in circumstances of 
deep consultation, not only a consideration of “alternative means of carrying out 
the designated project”185 but also “alternatives to the project”.186 The former 
accepts uncritically the need for the project and that the identified project is the 
preferred manner by which the underlying public objective is achieved, while the 
latter gives a more fulsome voice to Aboriginal viewpoints on development 
visions that impact their interests. From a justificatory standpoint, requiring the 
Crown to consider alternatives promotes a dialogue over competing development 
visions, but also requires the Crown to articulate in terms that address themselves 
to Aboriginal interests why the Crown’s development approach is preferred. 
Examining the need for the project requires justification of the Crown’s objective. 
This is not to suggest that the objective has to meet the “compelling and 
substantial” requirement in the Sparrow test, but where the strength of claim 
merits deep consultation, the reconciliation goal that underlies the requirement to 
show that the Crown’s objectives are of compelling and substantial importance 
remains relevant.187 Alternatives analysis also captures the minimal infringement 
requirement by raising a burden of justification on the Crown to demonstrate why 
a less harmful (to Aboriginal interests) alternative is not preferred.188  
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  CEAA,	  supra	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  2,	  s.19.	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  CEAA	  1992,	  supra	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  98,	  s.16.	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  Gladstone,	  supra	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  67	  at	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A second element to which greater attention is required to be paid relates to 
the question of cumulative effects. The diminishment of Aboriginal rights and 
interests over time and with each new development proposal is a central source of 
Aboriginal frustration.189 As described above, the courts have been sensitive to the 
issue of cumulative impacts on asserted Aboriginal rights, but project-based 
assessment presents some limitations in the consideration of cumulative impacts 
over large areas and time scales.190 The judicial recognition of the significance of 
cumulative impacts militates in favour of a more strategic approach to assessment, 
which would consider cumulative impacts on a regional scale. Picking up on the 
discussion of alternatives, strategic environmental assessment allows for 
consultation at early stages of development planning processes providing for 
greater opportunities for articulation of shared development priorities and 
expectations in advance of specific project proposals. Other strategic tools beyond 
the assessment of policies, plans and programmes (the typical domain of SEA), 
such as regional cumulative impact studies and scenario building, can usefully 
contribute to properly understanding the long term implications of sustained 
resource development on Aboriginal interests. 
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  Yahey	  v.	  BC,	  supra	  n.125;	  Lameman	  v.	  Alberta,	  [2012]	  A.J.	  No.	  337	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  of	  treaty	  rights	  claim	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  cumulative	  impacts	  of	  development);	  Environmental	  Law	  Centre,	  Environmental	  Assessment	  
in	  British	  Columbia	  (Victoria:	  ELC,	  2010)	  at	  72-­‐73.	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  Gibson	  et	  al,	  “Strengthening	  Strategic	  Environmental	  Assessment	  in	  Canada:	  An	  Evaluation	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  Three	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  (2010)	  at	  192.	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There has been broad judicial recognition of the obligation to consult at 
strategic levels where decision-making processes are engaged, but this right does 
not obligate the Crown to conduct strategic level environmental assessments 
where they do not exist.191 It does, however, require some vigilance on the part of 
the Crown and the courts to recognize where policy level decisions can lead to 
adverse Aboriginal impacts. In such cases, the Crown will have to assess the 
whether a legal obligation to consult exists.192 In doing so, the Crown needs to be 
sensitive to the long-term implications on the exercise of Aboriginal rights 
associated with cumulative impacts. The test articulated in the Gitxaala case 
requiring consultation where a process creates “clear momentum” that forecloses 
future policy options has some application here, suggesting consultation 
obligations where strategic policy decision advance development opportunities.193 
Viewed in isolation, the impacts may suggest that the duty to consult be 
considered at the low end, but understood in a more holistic fashion, the duty may 
viewed as requiring a more discursive process. Sensitivity to the implications of 
government policy for future resource impacts and their consequent affect on 
Aboriginal interests was recognized in the Ross River case, involving the granting 
of exploration rights under the Yukon’s Quartz Mining Act.194 In that case, the 
court acknowledged that the requirements to implement the duty to consult are 
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  Canada,	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flexible.195 Critically, the court also notes that where “serious and long-lasting 
adverse effects” are present, “[t]he Crown must ensure that it maintains the ability 
to prevent or regulate activities where it is appropriate to do so”.196 
 
Providing for strategic level environmental assessment advances a more 
transformative approach to EA in that SEA processes encourage an information 
rich and participatory decision-making environment at the policy level. Giving 
Aboriginal groups an opportunity to shape policy and programmatic level 
decisions that will then shape project level decisions, including shaping the 
availability or at least feasibility of alternative development tracks, provides an 
opportunity for the development of a common set of normative arrangements that 
will govern future decision-making. Such an approach is consistent with the 
approach by the Courts to require consultation throughout the decision-making 
process. Insisting on strategic level assessment has both procedural benefits and 
substantive, norm-creating benefits.  
 
The use of strategic environmental assessment is consistent with federal, 
and to some degree, provincial, EA policy.197 The federal government has a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Ibid	  at	  para	  45.	  196	  Ibid	  at	  para	  51.	  197	  The	  Environment	  Act,	  C.C.S.M.,	  c.	  E125,	  s.	  12.0.1;	  First	  Nation	  and	  Métis	  Consultation	  Policy	  
Framework	  (2010),	  Government	  of	  Saskatchewan,	  available	  at:	  <https://www.saskatchewan.ca/~/media/files/government%20relations/first%20nations/consultation%20policy%20framework.pdf>;	  Environmental	  Protection	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strategic environmental assessment directive, 198 and the purpose section and 
sections 73 and 74 of CEAA expressly provides for “the study of cumulative 
effects of physical activities in a region and the consideration of those study 
results in environmental assessments”.199 
 
One of the reasons that cumulative effects arise is that decisions under EA 
processes accept that projects will result a harm to the environment and to 
Aboriginal interests, but that these harms are either insignificant or justifiably 
traded off against other public goals. The central evaluative measure for 
acceptability of impacts is the minimization of adverse impacts or the avoidance 
of “irreversible” harm. In these circumstances, small and diffuse, but acceptable 
harms may contribute to a broader erosion of Aboriginal interests, particularly 
where those interests are understood, as they properly should be, in 
intergenerational terms. From a reconciliatory standpoint, mitigation alone may 
offer little positive benefit to Aboriginal communities. Impact and benefit 
agreements provide one avenue for ensuring Aboriginal participation in the 
economic benefits from development, but the IBA process is a private negotiation 
conducted outside the EIA process. A further option is to require projects to 
adhere to a more sustainably oriented outcome that requires the project to identify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  And	  Enhancement	  Act,	  Revised	  Statutes	  of	  Alberta,	  c.	  E12,	  s.	  39(e).	  	  198Strategic	  Environmental	  Assessment:	  The	  Cabinet	  Directive	  on	  the	  Environmental	  Assessment	  of	  
Policy,	  Plan	  and	  Program	  Proposals,	  (2010)	  Government	  of	  Canada	  Privy	  Counsel	  Office.	  Online:	  <	  http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=b3186435-­‐1>.	  199CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.	  4(1)(i);	  implemented	  through	  s.73	  and	  74,	  to	  date	  not	  acted	  upon.	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positive contributions to environmental and social outcomes from the project, 
referred to as sustainability assessment.200 Gibson has noted that on occasion 
Canadian EA processes have sought to incorporate this “higher standard”, by 
requiring the proponent to include in their EA documentation a discussion of the 
“positive overall contribution towards the attainment of ecological and 
community sustainability, both at the local and regional levels”. 201  Such a 
reorientation, which is entirely consistent with the objectives of EA legislation,202 
moves away from viewing trade-offs as a balancing of competing interests, 
towards a more integrative approach, which looks at the long-term sustainable 
future of the impacted community.203 While reconciliation itself is often described 
in oppositional terms (balancing Aboriginal interests with those of non-
Aboriginals), the critical opportunity that the integrative orientation of 
sustainability assessment provides is the opportunity for the Crown and 
Aboriginal groups to deliberate over a shared development vision.204 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Robert	  Gibson	  et	  al.,	  Sustainability	  Assessment:	  Criteria	  and	  Processes	  (New	  York,	  Earthscan,	  2005).	  201	  Gibson,	  supra	  note	  33,,	  quoting	  from	  Red	  Hill	  Expressway	  EIS	  guidelines;	  noting	  Voisey’s	  Bay	  as	  another	  example.	  202	  CEAA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  s.4	  203	  Gibson,	  supra	  note	  201.	  204	  Potes,	  supra	  note	  178	  at	  38,	  citing	  Arthur	  Pape,	  indicates	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  sustainability	  in	  respect	  of	  lands	  and	  resources	  relied	  on	  by	  Aboriginal	  groups	  is	  a	  central	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  accommodation.	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The promise of transformational approaches is that over time, as actors with 
diverse interests confront those differences on the basis of reciprocal 
justifications, the politics engaged in is characterized by a more reasoned and less 
adversarial discourse. 205  Whether EA has resulted in the internalization of 
environmental values within systems of government decision-making remains a 
controverted matter. For his part, Joseph Sax, reconsidered his skepticism 
regarding NEPA, conceding that he “underestimated the influence of NEPA’s 
‘soft law’ elements”.206 Several empirical assessments of the long-term impacts of 
EA have concluded that EA does contribute to positive environmental outcomes, 
and to the broader process of norm internalization.207 There is, to be clear, nothing 
inevitable about transformational approaches to EA. As Doelle and Gibson have 
argued in relation to the revised structure of the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, 2012, governments can move to restrict the application of EA and 
insert more administrative discretion that serves to decouple EA from its 
substantive environmental objectives.208 The intertwining of the duty to consult 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Richard	  Devlin	  and	  Ronalda	  Murphy,	  “Contextualizing	  the	  Duty	  to	  Consult:	  Clarification	  or	  Transformation?”	  (2003)	  14	  N.J.C.L.	  167	  at	  214,	  noting	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  consult	  “create(s)	  incentives	  for	  the	  relevant	  actors	  to	  see	  each	  other	  in	  non-­‐adversarial	  terms”.	  206	  Joseph	  Sax,	  “More	  than	  Just	  a	  Passing	  Fad”	  (1986)	  19	  U.	  Mich.	  J.L.	  Ref.	  797,	  at	  804.	  	  207	  Barry	  Sadler,	  Environmental	  Assessment	  in	  a	  Changing	  World:	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  
Effectiveness	  of	  Environmental	  Assessment	  (1996)	  (Ottawa:	  Canadian	  Environmental	  Assessment	  Agency);	  Council	  on	  Environmental	  Quality	  (US),	  The	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act:	  A	  Study	  of	  
Effectiveness	  After	  Twenty-­‐five	  Years	  (1997)	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  CEQ);	  see	  also	  Taylor,	  supra	  note	  39;	  and	  Craik,	  supra	  note	  39.	  208	  Doelle,	  supra	  note	  135;	  Robert	  Gibson,	  “In	  full	  retreat:	  the	  Canadian	  government’s	  new	  environmental	  assessment	  law	  undoes	  decades	  of	  progress”	  (2012)	  30:3	  Impact	  Assessment	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  179.	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with EA provides an important countervailing force to the retrenchment of the 
robust environmental aspirations of EA. 
 
In this paper, I have sought to take stock of the implementation of the duty 
to consult through EA processes. Here I have argued that EA and the duty to 
consult are to a significant degree bound together. Consequently, my intent was 
not to demonstrate whether the use of EA to implement the duty to consult is a 
sound policy choice, but given their necessary inter-relationship, I have sought to 
show that careful attention needs to be paid to the constitutional dimension of the 
duty to consult along all stages of the EA process. At the heart of the duty to 
consult is the stringent demand for “meaningful consultation”, a requirement that 
cannot be neatly separated from the duty to accommodate. This I argue pushes EA 
towards its more deliberative and justificatory construction.  
 
None of the normative arguments I make regarding the form of EA require a 
radical departure from its current function and structure. In each instance, the 
Crown has the discretion to structure EA processes in ways that emphasize its 
transformative potential. The constitutional nature of the duty to consult ought to 
influence the exercise of that discretion in ways that are consistent with the goal 
of reconciliation. A requirement that focuses on the justification of government 
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decisions in ways that account for Aboriginal interests and perspectives, and 
provide a substantive basis for Aboriginal acceptance of the decisions made. 
 
The argument presented here does not seek to impose a formally substantive 
rationality on decisions affecting Aboriginal interests. Rather I view both EA and 
the duty to consult as forms of proceduralized obligations, whereby the process 
and substance are themselves deeply intertwined. Proceduralization respects the 
political content of choices being made, and in this regard, I think the SCC’s 
approach in refraining from giving substantive content to the duty to 
accommodate is sound, so long as it is accompanied by a robust understanding of 
the potential of process to transform legal relationships, as well as the stringent 
requirements that are necessary to realize that potential. 
